From the evacuation by the enemy of Dalton to the evacuation of Resaca.

As soon as the evacuation of his works by the enemy was known, we started in pursuit. Passing through Dalton we moved down the Sugar Valley road. The enemy left but little behind him but his well-built earth-works. A few cavalry opposed our progress. We camped at night about nine miles south of Dalton , camping in line of battle, facing toward Tilton, our backs to Rocky Face. On the morning of the 14th the division marched toward Tilton, to ascertain if any of the enemy remained in that direction. Upon reaching the main Dalton and Resaca road I received orders to move south toward Resaca, this division being the only one on that road and forming the left flank of the army. The division advanced to within about two and a half miles of Resaca , driving in the skirmishers of the enemy; but as Wood 's division, on our right, had not yet come up, and as firing was heard in rear of our right, the division was halted and directed to barricade. At 2 p. m. Wood advanced and made connection with the right of this division, and we advanced together until stopped by the heavy fire of artillery coming from the enemy's works. I received about this time an order from the general commanding the corps to hold the Dalton road running by my left flank. To do this I stationed Cruft 's brigade upon the left of the road, posting two of his regiments upon a round-topped hill about 100 yards from the road, and directing them to intrench themselves. These troops were not yet in position when the enemy was seen forming to attack them in flank, and word was at once sent the corps and department commanders of this fact. In the mean time Simonson 's battery, which had been advanced, was, as a matter of caution, withdrawn and posted to sweep the open ground to the rear of the threatened brigade. The attack came about an hour before sundown, and perpendicular to my line. The Thirty-first Indiana, stationed upon the round-topped hill, found itself fired into from three directions. They did the best they could under the circumstances; they got out of the way with such order as troops can hurrying through a thick brush. Directing their attack more to our rear than flank, the One hundred and first Ohio and Eighty-first Indiana were soon driven back, and the enemy was bursting exultingly upon the open field when Simonson opened on them with canister, which soon broke and dispersed that attack. The enemy formed in the woods and attempted to cross the open field again, but met the same savage shower of canister. Robinson 's brigade, of the Twentieth Corps, had also arrived and formed facing the attack. The broken regiments of the First Brigade hPad reformed near the battery, and the enemy was easily repulsed with very severe loss to him. The troops of the brigade did as well as could be expected, situated as they were. Attacked in flank, and greatly outnumbered, they could only get out of the way the best they could. Had it not been for the timely aid of the battery it would have gone hard with the brigade. Captain Simonson and the Fifth Indiana Battery deserve great praise; their conduct was splendid. The coming up of the Twentieth Corps was also timely, though, in my opinion, the fire of the battery was in itself adequate to the successful repulse of the enemy. The night and the day following our lines were adjusted and strengthened, and a constant fire was kept up upon the enemy. The division was formed ready to follow up General Hooker 's attack had he broken the enemy's line. Artillery firing was kept up during the night upon the rebel position. About 11 o'clock the rebels made a demonstration on our pickets, occasioning a general discharge of cannon and muskets along the whole line. Soon after, early on the morning of the 16th , it was found the enemy had evacuated under cover of the night. The loss of the division about Resaca, killed, wounded, and missing, amounted to 200.