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Hdqrs. Department and Army of the Tennessee,
September
18, 1864
.
General: Having been assigned by the President of the United
States, I assumed command of the Fourth Army Corps
April
10, 1864
. One division,
Major-General
Stanley
's, was stationed, two brigades at Blue Springs, and one
at Ooltewah; the Second
Division, then under command of
Brigadier-General
Wagner
, was at Loudon, and the Third Division,
General
Wood
's, was still in the Department of the Ohio, near
Knoxville.
My first duty was to concentrate the corps near Cleveland.
This was effected by the
25th of April
.
About one week's time was given to refit and prepare for the field.
A portion of the command had just completed a trying winter campaign in
East Tennessee, and was quite badly off in many respects, from shortness of transportation, clothing,
and other supplies.
The animals, in
General
Wood
's division particularly, were in a wretched condition on account of want of forage and
overworking.
The officers made extraordinary exertions to get everything in readiness, and when the order was given to march
to Catoosa Springs the entire corps was prepared to move with the
required number of rations, but it was soon found that the limited transportation,
taken in connection with its condition, was a source of constant embarrassment.
I speak of these things in order to place in a clear light the difficulties that the officers and men of this
corps met in
the outset of the campaign and nobly overcame, for when other portions of the army had full rations they were at
times obliged
to subsist on a diminished allowance.
The march commenced the
3d of May
, upon the arrival of
Major-General
Schofield
at Cleveland with the left wing of the army.
My command, in two columns, having pursued two distinct routes, one via Salem Church and the other via Red
Clay, arrived at Catoosa Springs on the morning of the
4th of
Maye
Major-General
Thomas
having already reached Ringgold with the rest of the
Army of the Cumberland, a junction was thus
substantially formed with it. A very little skirmishing occurred to the east of Catoosa Springs with a detachment of
General
McCook
's cavalry that had covered my left flank during the march from Cleveland.
Not feeling sure as to the intention or strength of the enemy, my command took up a strong position covering its
own approaches
and those to Ringgold.
Here the corps remained until the
7th of May
.
The day before instructions were received to march on Tunnel Hill
in such a way as to take the enemy in flank, if possible, while
Major-General
Palmer
with the Fourteenth Corps threatened him in front.
Tunnel Hill is a portion of a ridge separated from Rocky Face by a narrow valley, and situated to the west of it. The
tunnel on the Chattanooga railroad is through this hill.
From Catoosa Springs my command marched on the Alabama road due east to the vicinity known as Lee's house.
General
Newton
's division here formed, facing in the direction of the movement as a cover, while
General
Stanley
, followed by
General
Wood
, turned into a cross-road which led directly south toward Tunnel
Hill.
Stanley
skirmished with the enemy's cavalry all of the way, and removed obstructions that had been placed in the
road.
He came in sight of Tunnel Hill Station at about 9 a. m. Here the
enemy appeared in considerable force on the most prominent part of the ridge, and was firing with artillery upon
our advance, and also upon that of
General
Palmer
in his direct front.
We soon ascertained that this artillery was supported by cavalry, and
General
Stanley
moved a force along the northern slope, and carried the hill by 11 a. m., driving the enemy before him.
The command was then posted in such a way as to hold Tunnel Hill
in conjunction with
Palmer
's corps on my right.
The enemy occupied a strong position between us and Dalton, with
the barrier Rocky Face intervening.
This barrier is a continuous ridge some 500 feet high, exceedingly narrow at the top, except where an occasional
spur juts out to the east or west.
In many places six men could not march abreast along the crest.
The western face is generally, within sixty feet of the summit, an almost perpendicular steep, that cannot be
climbed.
The eastern slope is, for the most part, more gradual.
Buzzard Roost Gap is a pass through Rocky Face a little southeast of Tunnel
Hill.
The railroad and a wagon road lead through this opening toward Dalton, besides a small creek runs in the same direction, which the rebel general
had dammed up to complete his defenses.
These defenses consisted of several batteries situated on the right and left of the gap, bearing upon the
approaches to his
position, and a well constructed line of intrenchments at right angles to the railroad, also enabling the enemy
holding them
to bring a strong musketry fire upon any column moving toward his position.
General
Thomas
was directed to threaten the enemy in front on the
8th of May
, while
General
McPherson
was moving through Villanow in order to seize and occupy
Snake Creek Gap.
My part of this movement was to endeavor to put a force on Roeky Face Ridge,
and make a demonstration toward Buzzard Roost Gap in conjunction with the
Fourteenth Corps.
General
Newton
's division on the morning of the
8th of May
moved to the north end of Rocky Face, some
two miles above Buzzard Roost Gap
, where he pushed up a small force at first, driving the enemy along the crest.
IHe succeeded in taking about one-third of the height from the enemy, and establishing a signal station upon a
prominent point.
He had attempted to get possession of a rebel station, but owing to the rugged nature of the heights, and the
ability of the
enemy to defend so narrow a path, he could not reach it. In the mean time
Generals
Stanley
and
Wood
pushed strong skirmish lines, well supported, as far up the western slope as possible.
During the night following,
General
Newton
succeeded in getting two pieces of artillery upon the ridge.
The next morning,
May
9
, he attempted to make farther progress and succeeded in driving the enemy from 50 to 100 yards.
General
Stanley
during the afternoon of the 9th made a :reconnaissance into the pass of Buzzard Roost, developing a strong musketry and artillery fire, while
General
Wood
's division continued the same operations as the day before.
The casualties in my command resulting from these operations were between 200 and 300 killed and wounded.
In accordance with instructions from
General
Thomas
, the Fourth Corps made preparations to remain near Buzzard Roost Gap for the purpose of holding the enemy at Dalton, if possible, while the rest of the army, excepting
Stoneman
's cavalry, was moving through Snake Creek Gap to turn the
enemy's flank.
May
11
the troops of the corps were disposed as follows:
General
Stanley
to hold the gap,
General
Newton
to hold Rocky Face and the roads leading around the north
end of it, with
General
Stoneman
's cavalry covering his left flank, and
General
Wood
in reserve on Tunnel Hill.
During the evening of this day and on the morning of the 12th the general movement was progressing and the Fourth Corps found itself alone, confronted by the entire rebel army.
From the signal station on Rocky Face the enemy's movements could
be distinctly seen.
About 10 a. m. he moved out a strong force as if to turn my left flank and give battle, but after pressing in
the skirmishers the column
returned within his works.
The threat, however, was so strong that
General
Wood
's division was moved to the support of
General
Newton
.
During the night following the enemy evacuated Dalton.
May
13
at 6 a. m. I received the report of the enemy having left, and immediately ordered pursuit.
The corps moved at once to Dalton and came upon the enemy's rear guard of cavalry there.
We pushed forward toward Resaca,
General
Stoneman
with his cavalry pursuing the direct route,
McCook
's cavalry on a road near the base of Rocky Face,
and my corps marching by an intermediate road.
We skirmished with the enemy during the day, and encamped at dark about
eight miles
south of Dalton
.
Soon after we opened communication with the rest of the army before Resaca, happily finding that we were only one mile from
General
Schofield
's left flank.
Instructions were received from
Major-General
Thomas
, at 5.15 on the morning of
May
14
, to wit:
headquarters Department of the Cumberland, In
the Field,
May
14, 1864
.
Major-General
Howard
,
Commanding Fourth Army Corps
:
General: You will move your troops down the main roads toward Resaca until you form a junction with the rest of the army, when further orders
will be given you. Report your approach when you
get within sight of the troops in your front.
Very respectfully, yours, &c.,
These instructions were substantially the same as those I had already issued to my command during the night.
The general formation of
General
Sherman
's army at this time was as follows: The Army of
the Tennessee,
General
McPherson
on the right, with his right resting on the Oostenaula; center,
General
Thomas
' command, excepting the Fourth Corps; and the left,
General
Schofield
, on the Sugar Valley road.
The whole line faced easterly.
In obedience to the above order,
General
Newton
, followed by
General
Wood
, marched to the left of
General
Schofield
, and
General
Stanley
moved down the Tilton and Resaca road toward the enemy's extreme right.
On reaching
General
Schofield
we found him pushing his command toward the right and front.
General
Newton
formed on his left.
General
Wood
then changed direction so as to move on a Resaca road intermediate between
Stanley
and
Newton
.
The three columns were not at first connected, but very adroitly made their concentration in immediate contact
with the enemy's line, having skirmished heavily
in their respective fronts.
By the advance movement the general line was shortened, so that a great part of
Newton
's division was reserved.
Schofield
's left carried a line of the enemy's works by assault, and immediately a portion of
General
Newton
's division was pushed up, relieving more or less of
Schofield
's left center and holding every advantage gained.
Meanwhile a part of
General
Wood
's division came up abreast of
Newton
's, driving the enemy from his rifle-pits, and secured the position, while
General
Stanley
formed a junction on the extreme left, protecting his left flank by a brigade posted on the left of the
Tilton and Resaca
road.
The movements above described were necessarily slowly executed from the nature of the country, which was
exceedingly rough
and covered for the most part with thick woods, besides the enemy disputed every inch of progress by his force
already in
position, meeting our advance with strong skirmish lines.
The musketry firing during the day was quite heavy.
After our troops had been satisfactorily formed word came from
General
Stanley
that the enemy was making a movement to turn his left flank.
I saw
General
Thomas
personally, representing the exact condition of things to him. He directed
Major-General
Hooker
to send a division to my extreme left.
This was promptly done.
The division was guided by
Colonel
Morgan
, Fourteenth U. S. Colored Troops, temporarily attached to my staff, by
the most direct route.
This division (
General
Williams
') arrived just in time.
Stanley
's left had been turned, and was being forced back.
All of his reserves had been previously exhausted in extending his line.
A battery (
Simonson
's), however, was doing splendid execution, staying the enemy's progress, when a brigade of
Williams
' was deployed in its support.
The advance of the enemy was then immediately and effectually checked, and my thanks are tendered for the
generous and opportune
assistance rendered.
The casualties of the day were 400 killed and wounded in the corps.
During the night good intrenchments were made along my entire front.
General
Hooker
and myself were ordered to make an attack in conjunction on the
15th
, everything to be in readiness by daylight.
General
Hooker
was obliged to march about two-thirds of his command from the center of the army to the extreme left,
which movement took longer than was anticipated.
His troops were massed and commenced the advance about noon.
As he was the ranking officer I visited him early, learning his intentions as to the points and manner of
attack, and prepared
to support him in the way he asked.
By artillery and musketry firing, by strong demonstrations opposite my center and right, and by one real
assault, I succeeded in keeping heavy forces of the enemy from leaving my front or passing to the left, but did
not
succeed in holding any point of the enemy's works.
My command being on the right and the pivot, necessarily conformed in moving to
General
Hooker
's advance.
He, with acolumn of brigades, very handsomely drove the enemy before him, seized and held two important heights,
and also captured some artillery and prisoners.
The number of casualties during this day was large, among them
Brigadier-General
Willich
, of
General
Wood
's division, was severely wounded and obliged to leave us.
Harker
and
Opdycke
, of
Newton
's division, were wounded but remained on duty, and some valuable officers were killed.
During the night of the 15th the enemy evacuated Resaca.
Early on the 16th my corps led the pursuit along the direct road toward Kingstoh.
Skirmishing occurred with the enemy's rear guard so as to make our
progress slow.
The corps camped that night at Calhoun.
My command,
General
Newton
leading, continued the march next day, starting at 5.30 a. m., along the wagon road, except
Wood
's division, which moved on the right down the railroad.
We had heavy skirmishing all day. The enemy's custom is, when retreating, to form his rear guard of cavalry with a section or battery of artillery, sometimes strengthened
by infantry.
During this day's march the resistance was unusually great.
He formed three lines, some half or three-quarters of a mile apart, and barricaded with rails, seeking the cover
of woods with open fields in his front.
As soon as we had succeeded in driving the first line it passed to the rear of the third, and in some new and
favorable position made another line.
However, as we moved in two columns, we were able to make considerable progress.
The resistance increased as we approached Adairsville.
General
Newton
continued to deploy regiments as skirmish ers till he had a large brigade engaged.
General
Wood
, abreast of him, also skirmished heavily.
About 4 p. m. it was found that we had come upon the enemy's infantry in considerable force.
Preparations were immediately made to assault and carry this position if possible, but it required time to bring
up the troops
and get them in readiness.
General
Thomas
deeming it best, on account of the nearness of night, to make no formal attack, the movement already set
on foot was postponed.
Yet a real engagement was going on, since both parties continued to re-enforce the skirmish lines until they
were tantamount
to lines of battle.
The enemy opened upon our column with artillery, to which our batteries replied with spirit.
During the night the enemy withdrew.
We found that he had taken up a strong position and had partially intrenched it, and that his whole army was
present while
the heavy skirmishing of the evening before was progressing.
The casualties in my command at Adairsville were about 200 killed
and wounded.
May
18
, the corps moved as ordered six miles farther and encamped on Comasaua [Connasene?] Creek.
May
19
, at 5 a. in., marched,
General
Stanley
's division leading; reached Kingston at 8 a. m.
The head of column turned toward
Cassville.
The enemy was discovered on high ground just beyond the Two-Run
Creek, and as soon as our troops came in view he opened fire upon us from a 6-gun battery.
General
Stanley
promptly brought up his artillery, supported by a brigade of infantry, and replied to the enemy's guns.
He silenced them and drove them off. At this point I was directed by
General
Sherman
in person to move forward four miles to an old mill near the railroad, and there to go into camp.
As soon as
General
Stanley
had dislodged the enemy from the high ground east of the creek he moved forward.
On reaching a point about a half mile from this mill, severe resistance was made to our advance by the enemy's
infantry skirmishers, and from a prominent height
the enemy's infantry was discovered drawn up in two lines and advancing.
General
Stanley
formed his lines, his left resting on the railroad.
General
Wood
's division was moved to his right and
General
Newton
's moved to cover the left.
As soon as our lines were formed the enemy halted and began to cover his front with rail barricades nearly a
mile in our front,
but in plain sight.
Our artillery opened from different points, whereupon the enemy's first line gave way and passed to the rear in
considerable confusion.
Having been directed by
General
Thomas
to push on, I moved forward to the enemy's position, which he had in the mean time abandoned.
The command here went into position, having formed a junction with a portion of
General
Hooker
's corps that had been moving in a column to the east of us and parallel.
The corps had hardly halted, when an order was received to move at once straight on Cassville.
Stanley
's advance had hardly progressed a mile, when a sharp fire was opened upon his head of column.
He promptly deployed a portion of his command and several batteries of artillery were placed in position to open
the way.
The enemy's resistance was so determined that
General
Wood
's division was ordered up on
Stanley
's right.
The promptitude with which this division was deployed afforded me great satisfaction.
Newton
's division was directed to take post on
Stanley
's left, but all but one or two regiments of it were crowded out by our forming a junction with
General
Hooker
's corps.
In this position, with
General
Hooker
on the left and
General
Palmer
on the right, continuous skirmishing and artillery firing was kept up until after dark.
Before morning
Johnston
had abandoned another strongly intrenched position about Cassville and fled across the Etowah
River, destroying the railroad bridge.
May
20
,
21
, and
22
, the army rested in position near Cassville, renewed its
supplies, sent back everything surplus, and made other preparations for a movement on Dallas.
May
23
, crossed the Etowah River at Gillem's Bridge and went into position at Euharlee
Creek.
May
24
, crossed Euharlee Creek at Barrett's Mill and marched to Burnt Hickory,
where we encamped for the night.
May
25
, command marched by a settlement road, making a detour to the right of Burnt Hickory, and expecting to come into Dallas by a Van Wert and
Dallas road
. This route was taken to avoid collision with the numerous wagons of the corps in front of us that were obliged
to move on
one road.
About 2 p. m.
Lieutenant-Colonel
Mendenhall
, department inspector-general, met me at a point six or
seven miles from Dallas
, bringing an order from
General
Thomas
for me to move by the first left-hand road across to the direct Burnt Hickory and
Dallas road
, as the enemy had been met by
General
Hooker
's advance in considerable force.
This corps was marched as rapidly as possible, its head of column reaching Pumpkin
Vine Creek just as
General
Williams
' division, of the Twentieth Corps, was passing.
At
0.15 p. m.
General
Newton
's head of column arrived and his troops were placed in position in rear of
General
Hooker
's troops that were already forming, or formed for an advance.
The rest of the corps was marched up as rapidly as possible and moved on the right and left of the road.
At 5.30 p. m.
General
Hooker
's command moved forward, as I understood, with instructions to carry the cross-roads at New Hope Church, supposed to be not more than a mile distant.
I was directed to hold my command ready to move forward.
At 6.20 p. m.
General
Hooker
sent me word by a staff officer that he had driven the enemy behind his breastworks; that he was holding
his ground but was
hard pressed, and requested me to send up a column of brigades on the right-hand side of the road.
I commenced the march instantly with that formation, but, finding that I was losing time, owing to the
obstructions and difficulties
of the ground, I directed the troops to march by the flank along the road as quickly as possible until they
approached
General
Hooker
's position.
Here I saw
General
Hooker
himself, who requested me to form on the left of the road.
Newton
deployed his command as fast as he could, but by the time this was effected it was completely dark.
The other divisions, following
General
Newton
's, were encamped for the night on the right and left of the road, it being too late to locate them
otherwise in the thick
woods.
I have been thus particular on this point because criticisms have been offered like this, that had the Fourth Corps come up on
General
Hooker
's left the enemy would have been completely driven from his strong position at New Hope Church, and thus saved the army the long and fatiguing operations
which succeeded
General
Hooker
's assault.
I do not doubt the truth of the allegation, but the facts are, first, that my head of column only had arrived at
General
Hooker
's first position when his attacking movement commenced; second, that I was directed to hold myself in
readiness to move forward if ordered; third, that I did so move forward as promptly as possible the moment I
received word I was needed, but arrived too late to partake
in the engagement.
May
26
,
General
Newton
's line was relocated so as toform a better connection with
General
Hooker
.
General
Stanley
filled a gap on
Newton
's right with two or three regiments, the rest of his division in reserve.
General
Wood
gradually developed his line on
Newton
's left, driving in the enemy's skirmishers, crossing Brown's
Mill creek with his main force, and securing an important hill, then apparently opposite the enemy's
right flank.
These lines were found subsequently at different points to be within 100 yards of the enemy's intrenchments,
hence the firing of skirmishers, or from main line to main line, was constant and cost us many
men. Our lines were thoroughly intrenched as soon as possible, and every battery that could be brought to bear
upon the enemy
was placed in position and covered by. good works.
May
27
,
General
Stanley
moved to the left of
General
Newton
and relieved
General
Wood
's division preparatory to the latter making an assault on the enemy's line at a point which
Major-General
Sherman
had designated.
On a careful reconnaissance made by
General
Thomas
and myself it was ascertained that the enemy were then prepared to bring a cross-fire of artillery and
musketry upon the
approaches to that position.
Therefore I was directed to move
General
Wood
farther to the left and beyond all troops and endeavor to strike the enemy's flank.
Johnson
's division of the Fourteenth-Corps was sent to me as
a support.
I have omitted to say that the Twenty-third Corps,
Major-General
Schofield
commanding, was already in position on the left of the Fourth.
Therefore I selected a field on the extreme left and rear of the Twenty-third
Corps, which was pretty well concealed from the enemy by intervening woods, and in this massed the
troops,
Wood
's division on the right, formed in a column of six lines deep, and
General
Johnson
's on the left, with a brigade front.
The advance from this position commenced at 11 a. m. and in an easterly direction.
The columns moved forward with very little interruption for nearly a mile.
I thought we must have reached the enemy's flank, whereupon
General
Wood
wheeled his command toward the right till he was faced nearly south.
A brigade of the Twenty-third Corps,
General
McLean
's, deployed so as to form a junction with
General
Wood
on his right.
The latter pressed forward his skirmishers till a large open field was reached.
Here it was discovered that the enemy's works were still in our front.
Immediately the skirmishers were withdrawn and the column moved rapidly by the left flank at least another mile
to the eastward.
The ground was carefully reconnoitered by
General
Wood
and myself.
We still found a line of works to our right, but they did not seem to cover
General
Wood
's front, and they were new, the-enemy still working hard upon them.
I gave a little time for the troops of
Wood
's division to rest, and for
Johnson
's to form a little retired on his (
Wood
's) left.
From the position now occupied by the troops woods more or less open extended up to the enemy's apparent flank.
A road skirted the woods opposite our right, running perpendicular to the enemy's lines.
Another road ran obliquely toward the left and in rear of
Johnson
's position.
McLean
's brigade was sent to a place in full view of the enemy's works, a little to the right of the
point of attack, with a view to attract
the enemy's attention and draw his fire.
As soon as everything was in readiness, at about 5 p. m.,
General
Wood
commenced his advance,
Hazen
's brigade leading.
The entire column marched briskly forward, driving in the enemy's skirmishers and vigorously assaulting his main
line.
Complaint came immediately that the supporting column under
General
Johnson
was not far enough advanced.
General
Johnson
was directed to push forward a brigade to
Hazen
's left.
He answered that he was doing so, and that it would soon be in position.
General
Wood
became very heavily engaged, so as to necessitate moving forward his supporting lines, and he found
strong works in his front,
except, perhaps, opposite his two left regiments.
Colonel
Scribner
, who commanded
General
Johnson
's advance brigade, finding his own left fired into from across Pickett's Mills creek, halted and threw some troops across it for his own protection.
This delay occurring at precisely the same time with
Wood
's assault was unfortunate, for it enabled the enemy with his reserves to force back the left of
General
Wood
's line and bring an enfilading and reverse fire ,apon his troops.
Again by some mistake of orders,
McLean
's troops did not show themselves to the enemy, nor open any fire to attract his attention on
General
Wood
's right, so that the enemy was able to pour a cross-fire of artillery and musketry into his right flank.
Under these circumstances it soon became evident that the assault had failed, and that the troops must be
withdrawn with care
in order to bring off our wounded, and to prevent a successful sally of the enemy from his works.
General
Johnson
formed his troops in rear of and to the left of the entire position, while
General
Wood
carefully withdrew his division and formed on a ridge farther to the right.
General
McLean
having been requested to push farther to the right in order to-make connection with the rest of the
army., disregarded the
request and moved off at once by the road, leaving these two divisions isolated.
He (
McLean
) alleged in excuse that his men were entirely without rations.
Our losses were very heavy, being upward of 1,400 killed, wounded, and missing in
General
Wood
's division alone.
Though the assault was repulsed, yet a position was secured near Pickett's
Mills of the greatest importance to the subsequent movements of the army, and it has been subsequently
ascertained that the enemy
suffered immensely in the action, and regarded it as the severest attack made during this eventful campaign.
Johnson
and
Wood
made strong intrenchments during the night.
General
Johnson
received quite a severe wound from a shell and was obliged to leave his command the next morning..
During this movement and
fighting on the left,
Stanley
and
Newton
made strong demonstrations in their respective fronts.
At 4 p. m. the enemy tried their lines, from which he was driven back with loss.
May
28
, very little occurred on my front of interest except the readjusting lines.
Stanley
placed a brigade in reserve on the Acworth road opposite
the interval between
General
Wood
and
Major-General
Schofield
.
At 4.30 p. m. the enemy made a slight demonstration in front of
Generals
Stanley
and
Newton
, while he was making a regular assault upon
General
McPherson
's lines near Dallas.
The enemy was repulsed at every point.
May
29
, very little of interest occurred during the day. An assault was made by the enemy upon
General
Newton
's line at 11 p. m., which his troops handsomely repulsed.
Heavy firing was heard in the direction of Dallas a little later,
whereupon a strong demonstration by artillery and musketry firing was made by
Stanley
and
Newton
.
May
30
and
31
, skirmishing and some slight reconnaissances by ourselves and the enemy, but no material change
occurred.
June
1
, the movement of the army to the left commenced,
General
McPherson
and
General
Davis
having withdrawn from the extreme right position.
On the
2d
the movement was continued; the Twentieth and Twenty-third Corps and part of the Fourteenth passed beyond our extreme
left.
June
3
and
4
, nothing of consequence, excepting that I thinned and extended my lines so as to cover the ground
occupied by the Twenty-third Corps, and afterward by
Davis
' division, of the Fourteenth Corps, relieving those
troops in order to prolong our lines to the left.
The result of these movements was to cause the enemy to abandon his lines on the night of
June
4
.
June
5
, the command rested.
June
6
, marched toward Acworth, crossing Allatoona Creek, and massed the command near
Dr.
Peters
' house, on the Acworth and Sandtown road, about
two miles from Acworth
, which was already in possession of our troops.
June
7
,
8
, and
9
, all that was done by the entire army was establishing the depots at Allatoona, rebuilding the bridge across the Etowah, and bringing up supplies.
June
10
, movements were resumed.
The Fourth Corps was directed to follow the Fourteenth along the direct
Miarietta road
. The Fourteenth Corps having passed to the left this road was open to
my command.
I pushed forward
General
Stanley
's division in the advance until within view of Pine Top, which is an isolated hill just to the
south of the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road.
Here we encountered the enemy's skirmishers.
Pressing them back we discovered that Pine Top was occupied by the enemy in force.
At this point the command was halted to wait for the appearance of the Fourteenth Corps, which was to have the front in the order of march for the day. When
it appeared
General
Palmer
formed his line facing southward toward Pine Top. The two corps
formed in conjunction and pushed up to within cannon range of the enemy's line.
During the night batteries were put in position and good works were constructed.
June
11
,
General
Palmer
's corps gained a little ground to his left and front.
The interval left was filled by my command.
June
12
and
13
, heavy rains occurred and no change took place.
June
14
, my lines were extended about 300 paces, and advanced some three-quarters of a mile on the left toward
the east of Pine Top and in conjunction with the Fourteenth Corps.
During the last three days much artillery firing occurred.
We opened all of our batteries whenever the enemy showed any force.
During the night of the 14th the enemy abandoned his advanced lines at Pine Top and withdrew within his works,
already prepared, running from Kenesaw to Lost Mountain.
My troops occupied Pine Top as early as 3 a. m.
June
15
.
At 11 a. m. I received an order from
Major-General
Thomas
to form a column of attack and to move southward to the left of Pine Top promptly at 2 p.m.
Newton
's division was selected to take the lead, followed by the divisions
of
Generals
Stanley
and
Wood
.
General
Newton
was required to move forward briskly, with a strong skirmish line, and develop, if possible, a
practicable point for attack,
choosing his own formation.
It took
General
Newton
until 3 p. m. to get his column organized, when he pushed forward a strong line of skirmishers, which in
a few moments encountered an intrenched
skirmish line of the enemy.
This line was carried with very little delay, whereupon
General
Newton
moved up his main lines to the position gained.
The skirmish line was advanced still farther, but encountered so heavy a musketry fire that it was deemed
prudent to deploy
a portion of the advanced line.
I moved up
General
Stanley
to cover
General
Newton
's right flank.
In the meanwhile
General
Newton
had driven the enemy's skirmishers within his main works and reported them so thoroughly constructed and
so well manned that
I deemed it improper to risk an assault without a further reconnaissance, besides, the day was already nearly
spent.
General
Thomas
approved of my action and directed me to fortify where I then was.
The next day,
June
16
,
two
batteries were constructed on our skirmish line.
In the one on
Stanley
's front a valuable officer,
Captain
Sironson
,
General
Stanley
's chief of artillery, was killed.
During the night these two batteries were connected by main lines of intrenchments and our troops moved into
them.
The position of a part of these lines was such that the enemy's skirmishers had to be pushed back to gain it.
The whole line
was then in close proximity to the enemy's works.
Doubtless believing that we could carry several points in our front by assault, the enemy determined to withdraw
during the
night.
At any rate my troops entered his abandoned works by daylight on the morning of the 17th.
Our skirmish line found that of the enemy about a mile beyond these works, and in such a position as to indicate
that he had
simply withdrawn his left, without moving his right flank.
My lines were formed facing eastward,
General
Wood
on the right,
General
Newton
on the left,
General
Stanley
in reserve, and advanced well covered with skirmishers.
The difficulties of the ground were such that the enemy was enabled to resist our progress more than usual.
It took until night to drive the enemy's skirmishers across Mud
Creek.
After dark our skirmishers, having secured a favorable position, thoroughly intrenched it. Twice before daylight
the enemy
attempted to drive them back, but failed.
June
18
, at 6.45 a. m. it was reported to me by one of
General
Wood
's staff officers that the enemy appeared to be leaving, whereupon I directed
Generals
Newton
and
Wood
to advance a strong line of skirmishers to ascertain whether this report was true.
This movement was commenced at once; on
Newton
's front the enemy seemed taken partially by surprise and was driven from a main line of works.
General
Harker
, perceiving the advantage gained, without waiting for orders, deployed two of his regiments to secure
and hold this advanced position.
I directed
General
Newton
to move up his entire division in support.
General
Baird
's division, of the Fourteenth Corps, came up very
promptly on his left.
General
Wood
having gained the ridge east of Mud Creek,
intrenched the position, making a continuous work.
General
Newton
's troops were in such close contact with the enemy that three men were detailed from each company in the
front line to keep up a continuous fire to prevent him. from opening his artillery
or musketry, which, however, in spite of this precaution, was occasionally done.
As soon as it was dark
Newton
's division intrenched strongly within less than 100 yards of the enemy's works.
The advantage gained by these movements was great.
The line seized was that portion of the old line that jutted out from the new, which was necessary for the enemy
to hold in
order to prevent a successful assault upon his new position.
It had rained hard during the whole day, and Mud Creek was
swollen so that horses had to swim it, yet the troops managed to bridge it and cross with infantry and
artillery, and
secure the important ground before described.
General
Thomas
, as soon as he was apprized of the position of things, directed an assault for the next day, but the
enemy again withdrew
before morning.
June
19
, as soon as I discovered that the enemy had gone, I directed
General
Stanley
, at 6 a. m., to push forward toward Marietta, which he
did, followed by the other two divisions.
He encountered the enemy's skirmishers near Wallace's house, on the Marietta road, about three-quarters of a mile from Noyes' Creek, beyond which he drove the enemy with his infantry and
artillery.
General
Newton
came np and did the same on his left.
The command then took position on the western bank of this creek.
The enemy's position was in plain sight and within musketry range.
His lines seemed to extend along the crest of Little Kenesaw and the southern spur, refusing to his left after
reaching the
base of it. This line was apparently unassailable, being as strong as possible by nature, and havinig plenty of
felled trees
in its front.
General
Hooker
, who had moved in a parallel column, had crossed Noyes'
Creek farther south, and moved northward, until his left division was near my right flank.
The next morning,
June
20
,
General
Hooker
's left division.
���
Williams
') was relieved by
General
Wood
's division and one
brigade of
General
Stanley
's division.
During the forenoon Stanley crossed the creek in his front and constructed a line of works.
During the afternoon he carried a wooded hill in front of
Whitaker
's brigade, also another called Bald Knob in front of his right brigade (
Colonel
Kirby
's).
Whitaker
rapidly barricaded his new front.
He had hardly got his works constructed when they were fiercely assaulted by the enemy, who was repulsed with
heavy loss.
The attempt was renewed several times, but with no better success.
On
Kirby
's front, however, it was attempted to hold the knob by skirmishers, while the pioneers intrenched.
These skirmishers with the pioneers were forced back by the assault on
Whitaker
's brigade, which extended to them, and this position was lost for the day.
June
21
,
General
Newton
's division, having been relieved by
General
Palmer
, was moved to the right of
General
Wood
's, relieving a part of
General
Hooker
's troops.
At 11.30 a. m. I ordered that
Colonel
Kirby
and
Colonel
Nodine
,
commanding General
Wood
's left brigade, move in conjunction, and seize and hold the Bald Knob that
Kirby
had lost the evening before.
The enemy had then intrenched it pretty strongly, and it was under the hottest kind of a fire from his guns.
I directed a concentrated artillery fire of a half hour's duration upon this point, and ordered the advance,
which was promptly made.
The enemy was driven off, a number of prisoners were taken, the knob was secured, and the crest was intrenched
while the enemy
was firing upon it from two batteries of artillery.
General
Wood
pushed two of his regiments still farther to the front and right, and took possession of a height, which
made the enemy abandon a long
intrenched skirmish line, and enabled us to move forward our right across an open field, 400 or 500 yards.
June
22
,
General
Hooker
advanced his corps in an easterly direction on my riglt, and my right division was wheeled up in
connection with the movement,
occasioning heavy skirmishing in its front.
About 5 p. m. the enemy made an assault on
General
Hooker
's right division (
General
Williams
'), and I was soon requested to relieve his left division (
General
Butterfield
's) for a re-enforcement with my troops.
I sent every regiment that I had out of line at once.
General
Thomas
had already directed that
General
Stanley
's should be relieved by
General
King
's, but this could not be effected till after dark, owing to
King
's close proximity to the enemy.
As soon as relieved, during the night,
Stanley
pushed his entire command to my right.
June
23
, in accordance with request of
General
Thomas
, I tried an intrenched height in front of
Generals
Newton
's and
Stanley
's position, it being doubted whether or not this was a portion of the enemy's main line.
I opened upon it a concentrated artillery fire from as many guns as I could bring to bear, and immediately
afterward advanced
a strong skirmish line, which drove the enemy within his works, and developed a heavy artillery and musketry fire.
By this operation I advanced our lines, particularly on the extreme right, to very close proximity to the rebel
works.
These proved to be his main lines, covered by troublesome abatis and other entanglements.
June
24
,
25
, and
26
, the corps remained in the same position.
June
27
, in
General
Thomas
' special field orders, of
June
26
, I was required to assault the enemy's works at some point near the left of
General
Stanley
's division.
General
Palmer
, with his column on my right, was directed to carry the enemy's works in his front.
The whole movement was to take place at 8 a. m. After a careful examination of the ground, I found only two
points where the troops could have a reasonable cover in
Stanley
's front, and decided to make two columns of attack.
Brigadier-General
Harker
led one column and
General
Wagner
another, while
General
Kimball
moved in support in echelon with Wagner's brigade.
These columns had each a regimental division front, and were separated by about 100 yards interval.
The whole front was covered by a strong line of skirmishers.
Such troops of
Stanley
's and
Wood
's as were free to move were massed in support.
The artillery of the corps was so placed as to bring a heavy fire on the points of attack.
General
Palmer
's arrangements were made simultaneous with mine.
The artillery opened from all points and continued firing for about fifteen minutes. At a preconcerted signal
the columns pushed rapidly forward, driving in the enemy's skirmishers, and were not checked until
they reached the entanglements in front of the enemy's works.
At this place the artillery and infantry fire became so galling that the advance was stopped.
General
Harker
is reported to have made a second advance, when he received the wound which caused his death.
Some of his men succeeded in reaching the enemy's works, but failed to secure a lodgment.
As soon as it became evident that the enemy's intrenchments could not be carried by assault the command was
directed to resume
its former position.
Our losses were very heavy, particularly in valuable officers.
I call special attention to the report of
Brigadier-General
Newton
of this attack, and to his opinion as to the causes of its being unsuccessful.
My experience is that a line of works thoroughly constructed, with the front well covered with abatis and other
entanglements,
well manned with infantry, whether with our own or that of the enemy, cannot be carried by direct assault.
The exceptions are where some one of the above conditions is wanting or where the defenders are taken by
surprise.
The strength of such a line is, of course, increased by well-arranged batteries.
Notwithstanding the probabilities against success, it is sometimes necessary to assault strong works, as has
occurred in several
instances during the present campaign.
From
June
28
to
July
2
, inclusive, preparations were made and partially executed for resting the left of the entire army
opposite the southern extremity
of Little Kenesaw, so as to extend the right and turn the enemy's left flank.
The enemy, doubtless perceiving these movements, evacuated his position in our front on the night of the 2d.
July
3
, the corps marched from camp in pursuit of the enemy at 5 a. m.,
Stanley
's division leading.
After passing through Marietta the corps followed a route to the
left of the railroad and came upon the enemy's skirmishers near Neal Dow
Station, between three and
four miles
south of Marietta
.
Stanley
's division was deployed confronting the enemy, the right resting on the railroad, and the other
two divisions were massed in reserve.
A little south of this point, at a place known as Smyrna Camp-Ground, the enemy had constructed another good
system of works,
behind a wide, open field, almost covering his entire front.
Having come upon the enemy's intrenched skirmish line, and it being late in the day when the troops had arrived,
no farther
advance was ordered.
July
4
,
General
Newton
's and
General
Wood
's divisions were moved up into line, on the left of
General
Stanley
's. At 9 a. m.
General
Stanley
was ordered to strengthen his skirmish line and assault and carry the skirmish line of the enemy, which
was unusually strong.
It had intrenched pits, with from ten to twenty men in each, and these in many places were not more than twenty
yards apart.
Generals
Newton
and
Wood
were ordered to move their skirmish lines in conjunction with
General
Stanley
's. The movement commenced at about 11 a. m. The lines were handsomely carried in
Stanley
's front under a trying artillery fire in addition to the musketry fire from the rifle-pits.
Immediately
General
Stanley
moved up his main line and intrenched the position gained.
This was within short musketry range of the enemy's continuous works.
General
Newton
took a part of the same line, as also did
General
Wood
at a later hour.
During the night the enemy again retreated.
July
5
, pursuit was continued by my corps along the railroad,
General
Wood
leading.
Very little skirmishing until the head of column reached Vining's Station.
From this point a road led to the east toward Atlanta, crossing
the Chattahoochee River at Pace's
Ferry, where the enemy had a pontoon bridge.
Wood
's skirmishers encountered a brigade of dismounted cavalry, which had its front covered by rail
barricades along a ridge at
right angles to the abovenamed road, and one-quarter of a mile from the station.
He quickly drove the enemy from his barricades and pushed on to the river, where he arrived in time to save a
greater part
of the enemy's bridge.
The dismounted cavalry seemed to have retreated by a river road, that we did not then know, toward the railroad
bridge, and
therefore escaped capture.
This accomplished, the command went into camp on the high ground near to and facing the river.
July
6
,
7
, and
8
, remained in position, making an occasional demonstration and feint as if to throw a bridge, with a view
to keep as large
a force of the enemy on the opposite bank as possible.
July
9
, in accordance with instructions from department headquarters,
General
Newton
's division was sent to Roswell Factory to support
General
Garrard
's cavalry in effecting a crossing of the Chattahoochee at that point.
He crossed and made a bridge-head.
July
10
,
Stanley
's and
Wood
's divisions moved to near the mouth of Soap
Creek, in support of
General
Schofield
, who had crossed the river at that point.
July
11
, at 5 p. m. received orders to secure the heights opposite Powers'
Ferry, on the south side of the Chattahoochee, to protect the laying of a bridge at that point.
Stanley
's division fulfilled these instructions the next morning at daylight, passing the river at
Schofield
's bridge.
July
12
, at 3 a. m. received the order from
General
Thomas
to move my entire corps to the south side of the river, crossing a pontoon bridge at Powers' Ferry that
Colonel
Buell
was directed to lay.
Wood
's division moved over as soon as the bridge was completed, while
General
Newton
's division returned from Roswell Factory and crossed the
next morning.
The two latter divisions formed a strong line on
Stanley
's left and front.
July
13
,
14
,
15
, and
16
, my command remained in position.
July
17
,
General
Wood
's division moved down the south side of the river three miles, to clear the way for laying a
bridge at Pace's Ferry and cover the crossing of the Fourteenth Corps.
As soon as this was accomplished the division returned.
Owing to the rugged nature of the country, the want of roads, and. the proximity of the enemy's masses to Pace's Ferry,
Wood
's movement was an important and delicate one.
It was satisfactorily executed, and without an engagement.
July
18
, an intimation was given by signal dispatch, about midnight, that orders would be received to march at
daylight.
Upon this dispatch the corps was directed to move.
The order of instructions was not received till 5 a. m., just as the corps was moving.
As far as concerned this command, it was to march directly on Buck
Head and go into position on the left of the place, along the Turner's
Ferry and Buck Head road.
Newton's head of column left camp at 4.30 a. m. Very little opposition was
encountered till near Nancy's Creek, on the opposite side of
which the enemy's cavalry was disposed, supporting a section of artillery.
The bridge across the creek was partially burned.
The enemy opened his artillery on
Newton
's advance.
Batteries, however, were placed in position and fired, driving off the enemy's guns.
After some little delay the creek was crossed, the enemy driven away, and the bridge rebuilt.
The column progressed, skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry; reached Buck Head about noon and took up the position above indicated.
July
19
, in accordance with instructions from
General
Thomas
,
General
Wood
's division made a reconnaissance down the Buck
Head and Atlanta road, reaching Peach Tree Creek at 6.30 a. m. The enemy's outposts, driven in by
General
Wood
, burned the bridge after crossing.
Having accompanied this reconnaissance, I discovered a well-constructed bridge-head on the high ground beyond
the creek.
The enemy had artillery and infantry, and was in considerable force.
Stanley
meanwhile reconnoitered on the Decatur road.
Driving the enemy's skirmishers, he seized the bridge, just burning, across the north fork of Peach Tree Creek and saved the most of it.
Newton
pushed a reconnaissance on an intermediate road to Peach Tree
Creek, but found the bridge already destroyed and the enemy intrenched in force on the opposite bank.
All of these facts were immediately reported to
General
Thomas
.
At 11.20 a. m. instructions were received from
General
Thomas
to cross Peach Tree Creek, whereupon
General
Wood
was required to effect a crossing near his position.
He succeeded in crossing the creek beyond the enenmy's left flank, turned his position, forced him from the
bridge-head, and
moved over two brigades of his division to hold the points gained.
He immediately commenced to rebuild the bridge.
Stanley
also, on the Decatur road, repaired the old bridge and
constructed a new one.
Newton
's division was moved to Peach Tree Creek in
support of
General
Wood
.
Stanley
moved across the north fork and encamped for the night.
July
20
, there being a slight conflict of orders received, I visited department headquarters at daylight, and
was instructed to push
one division on the direct
Atlanta road
, and to move the other two as directly as possible to the support of
General
Schofield
.
General
Newton
was instructed to relieve the troops of
General
Wood
in his vicinity, and
General
Wood
to close up on
General
Stanley
on the Decatur road.
General
Stanley
commenced the march at 7 a. m., and proceeded to the crossing of the south fork of Peach Tree Creek, followed by
General
Wood
.
Here the bridge was found to have been burned.
Having pushed over a strong skirmish line, a new bridge was built.
At 10 a. m.
General
Stanley
began to cross his column.
His skirmishers were already engaged.
Communication was had with
General
Schofield
, who was moving on a road about a mile to our left.
This road and mine gradually converged toward Atlanta.
Soon the enemy fired with shells and canister upon
Stanley
's advance, and the resistance became obstinate, thus indicating that we were in the presence of a large
force.
General
Stanley
drove in the enemy's outposts, and came up in sight of intrenchments, well made and well located, in
front of which the usual
line of skirmishers was formed.
Little was done until near night, except to deploy our lines and make works in close proximity to the enemy's
position,
General
Wood
forming to the right of
General
Stanley
.
During the afternoon and evening
General
Stanley
had a severe skirmish, driving in portions of the enemy's picket-line and capturing the rest in his
front.
Newton
's division, in accordance with instructions from department headquarters, endeavored to push on
toward Atlanta on the direct road.
As
General
Newton
was separated from the other two divisions of the corps by an interval of nearly two miles, and as it
was difficult, if not impossible, to communicate with him, I directed that he should report for orders to
General
Thomas
.
The latter instructed him to wait till the Twentieth Corps had formed
a junction with him, and then advance.
About 1 p. m. he ordered forward his skirmishers, driving in those of the enemy, securing for himself important
ground, and ascertaining
that the enemy was near by in strong force, whereupon he located two brigades in line nearly perpendicular to
the road, on the right and left, and moved the other up in column for support.
Between the two deployed brigades a battery of four guns was placed.
General
Newton
covered his front as rapidly as possible with rough rail barricades.
Soon he was severely attacked in front by a division of the enemy.
Another division had already pushed back his skirmishers and passed his left flank, thrusting itself between the
Pea Vine and Peach Tree Creeks.
Immediately after the front attack a third
rebel division attacked his right.
The general seems to have given his attention first to his left.
His artillery not in position in front was located in the rear, and together with some musketry fire from
detached regiments,
checked and drove back this flanking force into the woods.
Next the front attack, which enveloped the left, was handsomely met and the enemy was driven back with loss.
The attack upon his right was repulsed by his right brigade, which was obliged to protect its flank by forming a
line at right
angles to its position.
This flank was, however, soon covered by the advance of the Twentieth
Corps.
A second attempt was made on
Newton
's left and rear.
This time
Major-General
Thomas
had sent him an additional battery from the Twentieth Corps,
which, in conjunction with the guns already in position and another 4-gun battery belonging to
Newton
, opened fire upon the enemy's columns.
He was then!
easily repulsed, after the first attack.
Several subsequent assaults were made upon
Newton
's lines, the action lasting till after dark.
The brigade commanders,
Brigadier-General
Kimball
,
Colonels
Bradley
and
Blake
, are highly complimented for gallantry; also other officers, in
General
Newton
's report.
The position held was vital, securing, as it did, the Buck Head
and Atlanta road, and constituting the left of our right wing, while the army was divided.
The loss of the division was small compared with that of the Twentieth
Corps engaged on its immediate right.
This resulted from the peculiar disposition of the troops, and that they had time to cover their front with
slight barricades.
The enemy's loss in killed and wounded in front of this division amounted to upward of 1,500, while the
casualties of the division itself were about 100.
General
Newton
's division held possession of the field, and buried the enemy's dead.
In the night the enemy withdrew from the angle between
Newton
's left and the north fork of Peach Tree Creek, enabling
General
Wood
in the morning to swing up a mile and a half upon his extreme right.
July
21
,
Generals
Stanley
and
Wood
again pressed up close to the enemy's new lines and skirmished sharply with him during the entire day.
Batteries were placed
in position and fired continuously at every point where they could produce any effect.
During the night the enemy evacuated his works and moved into Atlanta.
July
22
, at daylight
General
Stanley
and
General
Wood
moved on different roads toward Atlanta.
Stanley
came upon the enemy's skirmishers about two miles from the city, and immediately deployed his lines.
General
Wood
formed upon his right, pushing well to the front and taking possession of an important ridge.
General
Newton
moved up on the Buck Head road and formed a junction with
Wood
's division.
In this general position my lines were established and fortified, and the batteries of the corps, for the most
part, placed
in such a position as to bring a fire upon the enemy's works or the city beyond.
During the day a terrific battle occurred between the enemy and the Army of the Tennessee on the extreme left.
Meanwhile, in accordance with instructions received, I held my command in momentary readiness to move.
July
23
,
24
,
25
, and
26
, my corps remained substantially in the same position, having completed a system of works strong enough
to be held by a thin
single line.
July
27
, in obedience to orders from
Major-General
Sherman
, I took leave of the Fourth Army Corps and assumed command of
the Army of the Tennessee.
In conclusion I wish to say that it pains me not to be able to give a substantial reward to officers who have so
faithfully,
so energetically, and unselfishly co-operated with me during our prolonged and arduous campaign.
I leave the gallant officers and soldiers in the hands of division, brigade, and regimental commanders for
honorable mention,
wishing it understood that I am the earnest friend of every one who is true and patriotic.
Major-General
Stanley
,
Brigadier-General
Newton
, and
Brigadier- General
Wood
, commanding divisions, have served the country for the last hundred days with ability and constancy, and
to them I tender my warmest thanks.
All under their command I must leave without special notice, from the fact that otherwise the list would be too
extended.
For gallantry, efficiency, unflinching activity, and gentlemanly deportment I commend the different members of
my staff, viz:
Col.
F.
T.
Sherman
, chief of staff (captured while reconnoitering,
July
7
);
Lieut. Col.
J.
S.
Fullerton
, assistant adjutant-general;
Lieut. Col.
C.
H.
Howard
, assistant inspector-general;
Lieut. Col.
H.
Hayes
, chief quartermaster;
Lieut. Col.
D.
Remick
, chief commissary of subsistence;
Surg.
J.
Theo.
Heard
, medical director;
Capt.
E.
P.
Pearson
, Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, commissary of musters;
Capt.
Henry
Kaldenbaugh
, provost-marshal;
Capt.
Joseph
A.
Schoeninger
, staff quartermaster; Capt. It.
M.
Stinson
, aide-decamp (seriously wounded through the lungs,
May
27
);
Capt.
F.
W.
Gilbreth
, aide-de-camp;
Capt.
E.
H.
Kirlin
, volunteer aide-de-camp;
Capt.
Lyman
Bridges
, chief of artillery.
Maj.
Francis
Mohrhardt
is highly recommended for his carefulness in mapping the country passed over by the troops.
For maps Nos. 1 to 14, accompanying this report, see pp. 206-211. Nos. 15, 16, 17, and 18 will appear in the
Atlas.
It may not be inappropriate, now that I am separated from your army, to express my appreciation of the uniform
confidence
reposed in me by the commanding general, and to acknowledge that I owe any success or reputation I may have
gained while in command of the Fourth Corps, in a great measure to
himself.
Herewith please find a list of casualties, also of recommendations for promotion.
Report of casualties in Fourth Army Corps from
May
8, 1864
, to and including
July
26, 1864
.
Command.
Killed.
Wounded.
Missing.
Aggregate.
Officers.
Men.
Officers.
Men.
Officers.
Men.
Headquarters Fourth Army Corps
0
0
2
3
0
0
2
3
5
First Division
15
66
1,149
3
78
84
1,444
1,528
Second Division
32
375
114
1,864
0
73
146
2,312
2,458
Third Division
27
370
89
1,822
4
267
120
2,459
2,579
Total
74
962
271
4,838
7
418
352
6,218
6,560
Aggregate strength on leaving Cleveland, excluding the regiments left back as guards at that place and Ooltewah, 20,000 (very nearly).
Promotions for efficient service and gallantry in action have been recommended from time to time apart from this report.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
O. O. Howard, Major-General. Brig. Gen. W. D. Whipple , Chief of Staff, Departmnet of the Cumberland.
Report of casualties of the Fourth Army Corps from
May
3
to
June
5, 1864
.
Command.
Killed.
Wounded.
Missing.
Aggregate.
Officers.
Men.
Officers.
Men.
Officers.
Men.
Headquarters Fourth Army Corps
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
First Division
1
60
17
390
0
22
18
472
Second Division
9
162
41
831
0
11
50
1,004
Third Division
20
271
61
1,249
4
251
85
1,771
Total
30
493
120
2,471
4
284
154
3,248
Brigadier-General Wood reports 255 of his men as missing at the action of May 27 , and in reference thereto appends to his report a written explanation, of which the following is a copy:
I visited the battle-field of Pickett's Mills twice yesterday and examined it closely. The numerous single graves and several lines of trenches on the battlefield outside of the enemy's intrenchments (capable of containing from twenty-five to forty bodies) fully explain where most of the 255 missing of that day went to. I am fully satisfied that nearly the whole of them were either killed outright on the field or were wounded and could not be brought away, and fell into the hands of the enemy when we abandoned the field at 10 p. m. on the 27th .
Respectfully submitted.
O. O. Howard, Major-General, Commanding. headquarters Fourth Army Corps, Near Acworth, Ga., June 8, 1864 . Brigadier-General Whipple , Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.
O. O. Howard, Major-General, Commanding. Brig. Gen. William D. Whipple , A. A. G. and Chief of Staff, Dept. of the Cumberland.