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Hdqrs. Second Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, Near Atlanta, Ga.,
September
--,
1864
.
Captain: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by this division during the campaign of
the united armies,
under the command of
Major-General
Sherman
, against the enemy's forces in Georgia, from the Ist day
of
May
to the
22d day of August
, at which time I assumed command of the Fourteenth Army Corps:
After the return of this division from the campaign in
East Tennessee in
December, 1863
, it went into camp at McAfee's Church, near Rossville, Ga. Comfortable quarters were soon built by the troops, and the
remainder of the winter was well occupied in drilling, outfitting,
and preparing the command for active operations in the spring.
Several expeditions and reconnaissances were made by the division or parts of it during the winter and spring,
special reports of which have already been made.
On the
1st of May
, at which time orders were received for the commencement of active operations, the division consisted of
three brigades and two field batteries, organized and commanded as follows, viz: First Brigade, commanded by
Brig. Gen.
J.
D.
Morgan
, consisting of the Tenth Illinois Veteran Volunteer Infantry,
Col.
John
Tillson
; Sixteenth Illinois Veteran Volunteer Infantry,
Col.
Robert
F.
Smith
; Sixtieth Illinois Veteran Volunteer Infantry,
Col.
William
B.
Anderson
; Tenth Michigan Veteran Volunteer Infantry,
Col.
Charles
M.
Lum
; Fourteenth Michigan Veteran Volunteer Infantry,
Col.
Henry
R.
Mizner
. Second Brigade, commanded by
Col.
J.
G.
Mitchell
, consisting of the Thirty-fourth Illinois Veteran Volunteer Infantry,
Lieut. Col.
Oscar
Van
Tassell
; Seventy-eighth Illinois Volunteer Infantry,
Col.
Carter
Van
Vleck
; Ninety-eighth Ohio Volunteer Infantry,
Col.
John
S.
Pearce
; One hundred and eighth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, [
Lieut. Col.
Joseph
Good
]; One hundred and twenty-first Ohio Volunteer Infantry,
Col.
H.
B.
Banning
; Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry, [
Capt.
L.
S.
Bell
]. Third Brigade, commanded by
Col.
Daniel
McCook
, consisting of the Twenty-second Indiana Veteran Volunteer Infantry,
Lieut. Col.
William
M.
Wiles
; Eighty-fifth Illinois Volunteer Infantry,
Col.
C.
J.
Dilworth
; One hundred and twenty-fifth Illinois Volunteer Infantry,
Col.
O.
F.
Harmon
; Eighty-sixth Illinois Volunteer Infantry,
Lieut. Col.
A.
L.
Fahnestock
; Fifty-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry,
Lieut. Col.
C.
W.
Clancy
; One hundred and tenth Illinois Volunteer Infantry,
Lieut. Col.
E.
H.
Topping
.
Artillery, commanded by
Capt.
C.
M.
Barnett
; Fifth Wisconsin Battery, commanded by
Capt.
George
Q.
Gardner
(veteran); Battery I, Second
Illinois Artillery, commanded by
Lieutenant
Coe
(veteran). The Tenth Michigan and Fourteenth Michigan Regiments at the commencement of the campaign were on veteran furlough,
and rejoined the division respectively at Resaca and near Acworth.
The Third Ohio Regiment had been detailed by department commander for
permanent garrison duty at Chattanooga, Tenn., where it served
until the expiration of its term of enlistment.
The One hundred and tenth Illinois Regiment was stationed at Nashville, Tenn., for the purpose of bringing forward transportation
when obtained.
Transportation overtook the division on the
26th of May
.
The regiment for some time after was kept with the train as guard, &c. It reported to its brigade for duty
on the
20th day of July
.
On the morning of the
2d of May
, in compliance with orders,
Morgan
's and
Mitchell
's brigades and the batteries marched to Ringgold,
Ga., and went into camp on the East Chickamauga Creek.
On the morning of the 3d
McCook
's brigade marched from
Lee
and Gordon's Mills, and joined the division at Ringgold.
On the morning of the 5th the division passed through the gap at Ringgold, and went into bivouac near the stone church, at the forks of the Dalton
and
Cleveland roads
. The enemy's pickets were encountered by
Morgan
's skirmishers in small force.
On the morning of the 7th the advance of the army was assigned to my division, and at daylight
McCook
's brigade, followed by the rest of my command, moved on the direct road to Tunnel Hill.
The enemy's cavalry was soon encountered and some sharp skirmishing kept up until the head of the column reached
Smith's house, within cannon range of the enemy's position at Tunnel Hill.
At this point the enemy opened his artillery, but being familiar with the ground, I soon made disposition of my
troops and
placed a few guns in position, and ordered them to return the fire, which was promptly executed.
In accordance with the general plan for the advance upon that place,
Major-General
Howard
's corps moved from Cherokee Springs, from the
direction of Cleveland, and formed a junction with my command at
this point.
General
Howard
sent a force to operate on the north end of Tunnel Hill,
while a strong line of skirmishers from Me-
Cook
's brigade, gallantly commanded by
Major
Holmes
, Fiftysecond Ohio Infantry, attacked the enemy's position below the
town near where the road leading to Dalton crosses the hill.
These movements, assisted by the action of the batteries, caused the enemy to withdraw from his position and
retreat toward
Buzzard Roost.
In compliance with orders, I moved my entire division beyond the town and took position on the right of the
Dalton road, and sent a regiment from
Morgan
's brigade to take possession of a high round hill immediately in my front, known to us as Signal Hill.
This duty was well performed by the Tenth Illinois Regiment, commanded by
Colonel
Tillson
.
McCook
's brigade had the advance during the day, and most of the fighting required to be done in
driving in the enemy's pickets and skirmishers
was gallantly performed by his troops, superintended by himself.
The division remained in this position until the forenoon of the
9th
, when an advance into the gap of Buzzard Roost was
determined upon.
Mitchell
's brigade was ordered to advance along the left of the road and drive in the enemy's pickets,
occupying a little group of round-shaped
hills in front of the enemy's works, which obstructed the gap. This duty was performed by a line of skirmishers,
supported
by his whole, brigade.
The ground thus gained was held, and my entire division took position in the gap.
During the succeeding three days my troops were kept more or less under fire: The enemy, after persistent and
sometimes heavy skirmishing, was driven into
his works in the gorge and upon the top of Rocky Face.
The operations of these three days were mostly executed and the fighting done by
General
Morgan
's brigade.
Much of the fighting consisted in heavy skirmishing, and on several occasions, when attempts were made to feel
of the enemy's
works, it became almost a general engagement in severity.
Captain
Barnett
, my chief of artillery, with much difficulty succeeded in getting a part of his artillery in position,
and operated very successfully
with it against the enemy's batteries and works.
The privations and hardships my troops were compelled to undergo during these few days' operations, and their
constant exposure
to the fire of the enemy's artillery, as well as his skirmishline and sharpshooters, and the consequent heavy
loss in killed
and wounded, gave the highest proof of their discipline and courage, and the zeal with which they were entering
upon the long
and arduous campaign before them.
On the
12th
my command was relieved from its position in the gap by troops from the Fourth Corps, and, following the other divisions of the corps, marched at sunrise for
Snake Creek Gap, which place it reached at dark.
During the night it passed through the gap and bivouacked early on the 13th near the field-works thrown up by
General
McPherson
's command in the vicinity of Resaca.
In compliance with instructions, after a few hours rest, the division took a position in line on the left of the
corps in
the general advance upon the enemy's position near Resaca.
During the night of the 13th the division occupied a position a little in reserve of the left of the corps and
connected pickets with
Major-General
Schofield
's right.
On the
14th
, conforming to the movement of troops on the right and the general plan of advance, the division moved
forward from one position to another until the enemy's main lines were reached.
The troops on several parts of our lines had become warmly engaged with the enemy during the forenoon, and his
main line of
battle in front of our right was well developed.
In the afternoon, in compliance with orders, I sent
Mitchell
's brigade to the support of a part of our lines, composed of
Brigadier-General
Judah
's command, of the Twenty-third Corps, and
Brigadier-General
Turchin
's brigade, of the Fourteenth Corps, which were
reported as being hard pressed by the enemy.
This brigade moved promptly and gallantly into position.
Relieving these troops, they entered immediately into the fight.
The conduct of this brigade was highly creditable to both officers and men.
Colonel
Mitchell
's conduct was conspicuous on this occasion for personal gallantry.
My batteries were exceedingly well posted on a high ridge overlooking the enemy's works and were well manned all
day. Their
conduct was very conspicuous on this occasion.
The effect of their projectiles was unusually severe upon the enemy's lines, driving him several times from his
rifle-pits.
During the night, in obedience to orders, I moved the entire division, except the batteries, to the right, and
relieved the
division of
General
Butterfield
, of the Twentieth Corps, and the brigade of
General
Carlin
, of the Fourteenth Corps, from their position in the front
line.
The troops worked assiduously all night, strengthening and completing the works previously commenced by
General
Butterfield
's troops.
The 15th my skirmish line was sharply engaged all day, but no general movement of my troops was made.
Early on the morning of the
16th instant
it was ascertained that the enemy had abandoned his position and was crossing the river.
I received orders to march with as little delay as possible with my command down the west bank of the Oostenaula River to the mouth of the Armuchee Creek, with a view to co-operating
with the cavalry forces in that vicinity.
It was supposed that a bridge existed across the river at this point, over which the forces operating on this
flank of the
army could cross and cut the railroad between Kingston and Rome, and rejoin the main column in its pursuit of the retreating
enemy.
The division made a rapid march of
fifteen miles and encamped at dark a few miles from the Armuchee.
During the night the cavalry forces, under the command of
Brigadier-General
Garrard
, passed through my camp en route for Lay's Ferry, near Resaca.
General
Garrard
reported his inability to find any bridge across the Oostenaula above Rome, and his determination to return and cross the river with the main column near
Resaca.
This condition of affairs placed me in an embarrassing position as to how to act under the circumstances.
Believing, however, that the main object of the expedition could best be obtained by pushing on to Rome with my command, and try to secure the bridge and capture that
place, I immediately sent a communication to
Major-General
Thomas
of my determination, and early on the morning of the 17th resumed the march in that direction.
About noon the first of the enemy's pickets were found at Farmer's Bridge
over the Armuchee.
This place is
eight miles from Rome
.
Here I determined to park the trains and allow the troops time to rest and get dinner.
About 2 p. m. the column, except two regiments left behind to guard the trains, resumed the march.
Mitchell
's brigade had the advance and pushed rapidly forward, driving in the enemy's cavalry until
within cannon range of the enemy's works
on De Soto Hill on the west side of the Oostenaula River.
Colonel
Mitchell
reported the enemy in strong force in his front, and his advanced guard, Thirtyfourth Illinois Regiment, commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel
Van
Tassell
, sharply engaged with his skirmishers.
I immediately made disposition of my troops for the purpose of driving in the enemy's outposts, so as to
reconnoiter his works.
This was scarcely commenced before he opened with a battery of artillery upon the advance troops, and at the
same time a brigade
of infantry advanced from the works to attack us. I immediately ordered
Col.
Daniel
McCook
to move his brigade as rapidly as possible to the front and take position on a commanding ridge to the
left of the Resaca and Rome road, still held by our skirmishers.
McCook
moved promptly into position and deployed his troops so as to be able to give or receive an attack at
any time.
By this time the enemy was observed advancing, apparently with a view of taking possession of a ridge directly
in front of
the one just taken by
McCook
's brigade, and extending some distance to his right.
This ridge offered a better and more extended line of battle, and I ordered
McCook
to advance and take possession of it. The movement was promptly executed, just in time to meet the enemy
in about equal force
ascending the opposite slope to the attack.
Both parties opened fire with great determination, and the enemy at this time indicated a disposition to give a
general battle
outside of his works.
From the best information I could get I was well satisfied his forces did not exceed mine in numbers.
The gallant manner in which
McCook
's brigade went into battle and sustained it, notwithstanding a march of eighteen miles since
morning, determined me to accept the issue, and
Mitchell
's brigade was promptly deployed on the right of the road in supporting distance of
McCook
.
The batteries were put in position and opened fire for a few rounds.
Morgan
's brigade was massed in reserve during the attack on
McCook
's brigade, but a report received at this time that the enemy was moving in heavy force to my
right, together with the demonstrations
his skirmishers were making in that direction, determined me to move
Morgan
to that flank, with orders to push out skirmishers to the Alabama road.
The emergency as well as the approach of night required great promptness in the execution of the movement.
The emergency was fully met, and by dark
Morgan
had driven in the enemy's skirmishers and formed his entire brigade on the Alabama road close up to the enemy's works.
McCook
and
Mitchell
reported the enemy repulsed on their fronts, and I ordered a strong skirmish line to be thrown out, with
instructions to
force those of the enemy back into his works, behind which his main forces had taken refuge.
This was handsomely done, and our main lines established upon the most advantageous ground that could be
selected.
My lines as now established completely invested the enemy's works on the west bank of the river, my left being
so near the
Oostenaula and my right so near the Coosa, as to prevent my flank from being turned from either direction.
My loss in killed and wounded did not exceed 150 men.
Lieutenant-Colonel
Wiles
and
Major
Shea
, of the Twenty-second Indiana Regiment, were both seriously wounded.
Notwithstanding the long march of eighteen miles and the fatigue of the field maneuvers and fighting during the
day, the troops stacked their arms and went vigorously to
work building breastworks, and by morning the entire line was well fortified.
The dense fog which prevailed in the morning prevented any movement, under the circumstances, until 9 a. m., at
which time it began to rise, and I ordered the works to be vigorously attacked in front of each brigade with a
strong
line of skirmishers.
This was done and the works soon taken possession of, having been abandoned during the night, except by a
skirmish line, which
fled rapidly across the river, burning the bridges behind them.
His rear guard was pursued so closely by our skirmishers that their
attempts to destroy the pontoons across the river were only partially
successful.
A few troops advanced into the works on De Soto Hill were sufficient to draw
the enemy's artillery fire from the two formidable field-works, one situated on the east bank of the Oostenaula and the other on the south bank of the Coosa.
The works were situated on two high hills, and completely commanded all approaches to them from the. opposite
side of the river, as well as the works just
abandoned by the enemy and now held by us. In order to test the full strength of the enemy, I ordered
Barnett
's and
Gardner
's batteries to be put into position on De Soto Hill and to
open fire.
This was done, and after half an hour's practice the superiority of our batteries was gratifyingly manifested by
an almost
complete silence of the enemy's guns.
While these movements were being made, the skirmish line had gradually closed to the river-bank, and was sharply
engaged with
the enemy on the opposite side.
The city was now completely at our mercy.
This fact, considered in connection with the best information I could obtain, convinced me that the enemy
intended to evacuate
the city, and was only prolonging his resistance in order to remove, as much as possible, his public stores.
To complete the capture of the city it was necessary to throw troops across the Oostenaula.
A point some distance above the enemy's works, near
McCook
's left during the engagement of the previous evening, was selected, and his brigade designated to
execute the movement.
The hazardous enterprise of effecting the first crossing was gallantly accomplished by the Eighty-fifth Illinois Regiment, commanded by
Colonel
Dilworth
, on rafts built of rails and logs hastily collected on the bank.
This regiment was crossed in an astonishingly short space of time, and soon began to drive in the enemy's
pickets in the direction
of the city.
The enemy, finding himself unexpectedly attacked from a direction which soon must result in his capture,
retreated in the
most precipitate manner over the Etowah River, destroying the
bridge behind him.
Dilworth
advanced his skirmishers down the Oostenaula, driving in those of the enemy, until his line reached the
city and extended to the Etowah, thus covering the railroad and all approaches to the city between the forks of
the two rivers.
This enabled us to reach the crossings over the Oostenaula, and secure what yet remained undestroyed of the
bridges.
The main bridges were entirely destroyed, but the pontoons were secured and repaired, and a bridge made in a few
hours sufficient
to cross the whole of
McCook
's brigade.
On taking possession of the city considerable public stores were found, notwithstanding the efforts of the enemy
to destroy
and remove them.
These stores consisted of quartermaster, commissary, and medical supplies, and were issued to the troops of my
command, except one large train of cars, loaded mostly with salt, and sent to Kingston.
A large amount of private property was found in the city, abandoned by the owners.
This consisted mostly of cotton.
All such stores were placed under guard, and in this condition were turned over to my successor,
Colonel
Bane
, commanding brigade, of Sixteenth Corps, Army of thL Tennessee. Three field pieces, five
32-pounder garrison guns, and two
8-inch howitzers were abandoned, and fell into our hands.
The large iron-works and machine-shops of Noble & Co., upon which the enemy relied for a large part of his
ordnance supplies
and repairs, were captured in good condition.
It was the intention of the enemy to destroy these shops and stores, but so sudden was the attack of
Dilworth
's skirmishers that he precipitately fled, and they fell into our possession.
The city was occupied by
McCook
's brigade until the advance was resumed.
Morgan
's and
Mitchell
's brigades went into camp on the west bank of the Oostenaula, occupying the works.
The enemy's pickets continued to hold the south bank of the Coosa
for several days, and kept up at intervals a vicious skirmish firing into the city, killing and wounding
soldiers and citizens
indiscriminately, until the 22d, when, in compliance with instructions,
Morgan
crossed a part of his brigade in pontoon boats, which had been sent me from the main column by order of
Major-General
Thomas
, and took possession of the opposite bank of the river.
The pontoon bridge was soon laid, and the whole of
Morgan
's brigade moved across and occupied the works, driving the enemy from that entire front.
On the
23d
Mitchell
's brigade and the batteries moved across the two rivers and bivouacked, preparatory to
commencing the advance the next morning.
The 24th the entire division moved from Rome to Euharlee Creek, where it struck
General
McPherson
's column, and went into camp.
The following morning it resumed the march to Van Wert, where it
again came in contact with
General
McPherson
's troops.
At this point I ascertained that a road running over the Allatoona Mountain, between the one occupied by
McPherson
's command and the Fourteenth Army Corps, could be
found.
I determined to move upon it. The road proved passable, and by a rapid march I was enabled to encamp my whole
command at night
within
three miles of Dallas
and in close support of the main column.
On reporting the arrival of my command, on the morning of the
26th
, I received orders from
General
Thomas
to make a reconnaissance in the direction of Dallas, with
a view of finding out the enemy's position on that flank and to open, if possible, communication with
General
McPherson
's command.
Taking the Burnt Hickory road and passing over Bishop's Bridge, across Pumpkin Vine Creek,
two miles from Dallas
, the advance of
Morgan
's brigade drove in the enemy's pickets and pushed into the town.
The whole division followed and formed line of battle on the East Marietta
road.
The head of
General
Mc-Pherson
's column arrived at this time and went into position, his lines running across the Villa Rica road.
Skirmishers ordered out soon found
Hardee
's corps intrenched in a strong position, covering the Marietta and
Villa Rica roads
, his right resting on the west end of Ellisberry Mountain.
During the night the troops erected temporary breast-works, and early on the morning of the 27th I ordered
McCook
's brigade to advance about a mile into a gorge in the mountain, through which a road passes
connecting the two roads leading from Dallas to Marietta.
A regiment deployed as skirmishers, after some hard fighting, discovered a brigade of the enemy's infantry
strongly posted
in this defile.
McCook
's whole brigade was during the day posted and intrenched so as to completely control this pass.
A regiment from
Mitchell
's brigade was sent to open communication with the right of
General
Hooker
's corps, then operating near the northeast end of Ellisberry
Mountain.
This communication was preserved by a line of sentinels from my command during the remainder of our operations
on this flank.
During the day the Twenty-second Indiana Regiment, after considerable
fighting, reached the enemy's lines on top of the mountain and held its position until night; but, while
attempting to withdraw, the enemy sallied out in pursuit in considerable force.
The One hundred and twenty-fifth Illinois Regiment was at this time moving out
to take position as a picket, and very opportunely arrived at the point of the conflict.
A general melee ensued, in which a number were killed and wounded on both sides.
The night was intensely dark and, where friend could not be distinguished from foe, the conflict became
exceedingly exciting.
It resulted, however, favorably to us. The position was held and a number of prisoners fell into our hands.
On the morning of the
28th
, in order to render the position between my left and
General
Hooker
's right more secure, I selected a strong position about midway between the two points, the distance
being three miles, and ordered
Mitchell
to intrench his brigade there and to cut roads to his rear connecting with the main command near Good
[New] Hope Church.
This work was well executed by
Colonel
Mitchell
and command, and much facilitated the subsequent movements of our troops in that direction.
As now posted my command remained without change of position until early on the morning of the
1st of June
, when, in concert with the Army of the Tennessee,
I withdrew and joined the corps, then occupying a position near the left of the whole army, in the vicinity of
Good [New] Hope Church.
Relieving a part of the Army of the Ohio,
Hovey
's command, it took position in the front line during the night, where it remained engaged in
constant skirmishing with the enemy until
the 4th, when it withdrew and took a commanding position on Stoneman's Hill,
filling, with two brigades, a gap between
General
Hooker
's command, on the right, and the Fourteenth Army
Corps, on the left.
During the night of the 5th the enemy evacuated his works, and early on the morning of the
6th
, taking the right of the corps in the pursuit, the division went into camp in the afternoon on Proctor's Creek, covering the road leading from Acworth to Big Shanty, two miles from the former place, where it remained in
comparative quiet until the 17th.
when it moved in concert with the other divisions of the corps to a position in front of Pine Mountain and formed on the right of
Baird
's division, connecting with the left of the Fourth
Corps in the afternoon.
During the 18th and 19th the division changed position several times in the general advance of our lines to the
enemy's position near Kenesaw Mountain, and the skirmishing was
frequently very sharp, particularly between a part of
Morgan
's brigade, which was ordered to drive in the enemy's skirmishers and to feel of his position on
top of the mountain.
This duty was gallantly done by the Sixtieth Illinois Regiment, commanded by
Colonel
Anderson
.
This demonstration, and the appearance of the troops at the base of the mountain while going into position, drew
forth a heavy
fire from the enemy's batteries on the summit and showed conclusively that he was there in force and strongly
posted.
The batteries of the division came into action, and during the remainder of the day contested the ground with
good success.
The troops were intrenched and field-works thrown up for the batteries during the night.
The troops remained in this position with but little change until the night of the
25th
, during which time sharp skirmishing frequently engaged the infantry, and fierce artillery contests
sprang up between the
contending batteries.
In these encounters our batteries invariably manifested their superiority and discipline over that of the enemy.
My command, except the batteries, was relieved by a division of the Sixteenth
Corps, of the Army of the Tennessee, and moved
during the night to the rear of our lines and bivouacked during the 26th in rear of
General
Stanley
's division, of the Fourth Corps, preparatory to
storming the enemy's works at some point near that place on the following morning.
Being informed by
Major-General
Thomas
of the distinguished duty for which my division had been designated, in company with
Generals
Stanley
,
Brannan
, and
Baird
, I made a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's works and selected the point of attack.
The point selected was immediately in front of
General
Whitaker
's brigade, of
Stanley
's division, of the Fourth Corps.
The enemy's works here conforming to a projecting point in the ridge, upon which his works were built, presented
a salient
angle, and, in the absence of abatis, fallen timber, and other obstructions which generally confront their
works, this point
seemed the most assailable.
Early on the morning of the 27th the brigade commanders accompanied me to the ground and familiarized themselves
with it.
McCook
's and
Mitchell
's brigades had been designated for this conspicuous duty, and at 8 o'clock were massed in an
open field in rear of our breast-works (now occupied by
Morgan
's brigade as a reserve), some 600 yards from the point to be carried.
No place nearer the enemy's line could the troops be massed without receiving the enemy's fire, both of infantry
and artillery.
The ground to be passed over was exceedingly rocky and rough, and a considerable part of it covered with forest
trees, interspersed
with undergrowth.
The signal was given a little before 9 o'clock, and the troops, following the example of their admired leaders,
bounded over our own works, in the face of the enemy's fire,
and rushed gallantly for the enemy, meeting and disregarding with great coolness the heavy fire, both of
artillery and infantry,
to which they were subjected, until the enemy's works were reached.
Here, owing to exhaustion, produced by the too rapid execution of the movement, the exceedingly rough ground,
and the excessive
heat, the troops failed to leap and carry the works to which their noble daring and impetuous valor had carried
them.
McCook
had fallen, dangerously wounded, and
Harmon
, next in rank, had assumed command, but fell immediately.
Dilworth
, the next senior in rank, promptly took command of the brigade, and with great personal gallantry held
his command to the fierce contest now being fought so near the works that a number of
both officers and men were killed and wounded at the trenches.
Mitchell
's brigade, moving in column parallel with
McCook
's, received and returned the fire with the same impetuosity and invincible determination, but failed,
from the same cause,
to carry the works.
The position of the troops at this juncture was one of extreme solicitude, and presented a problem of some
difficulty of solution.
To retire, and thus receive the full effect of the enemy's unrestrained fire, now considerably diminished in
severity by the
effect of our own, was sure to incur an additional loss.
A renewal of the assault in the present exhausted condition of the troops was exceedingly hazardous.
Under the circumstances, after a thorough examination of the ground and the enemy's works, I reported to
Major-General
Thomas
, and recommended that the position be held and the troops intrenched where they were.
This he ordered to be done, and intrenching implements were immediately furnished the troops, and both brigades
threw up works
a few yards from and nearly parallel to those of the enemy.
This was done under fire so severe that at times it might also be termed a general engagement.
Works thrown up under such circumstances were of necessity of rude character, but sufficed to protect the men
until night,
during which the whole command intrenched itself in excellent works.
During the succeeding six days the position was held, the troops sleeping on their arms at night.
Details were kept engaged in throwing up new works whereever an advanced line could be established, until the
morning of the
3d of July
, when it was discovered that the enemy had abandoned the position.
The assault failed in its immediate object, but the courage and discipline exhibited by the troops in the
attack, the determined
manner in which they clung to the works afterward, and the noble physical endurance displayed by them during the
six days and nights, have never been exceeded in modern soldiery.
Col.
Daniel
McCook
, long the admired and gallant commander of his brigade, fell with a severe wound, of which he
subsequently died at his home
in Ohio.
Colonel
Harmon
, of the One hundred and Twenty-fifth Illinois, succeeded him in
command, but fell immediately afterward.
He was a brave and skillful officer.
The loss of these two noble leaders was at the time a great misfortune to the troops, and will ever be to the
army and country a great loss.
In the list of killed are the names of
Lieut. Col.
James
M.
Shane
, Ninety-eighth Ohio Infantry;
Maj.
John
Yager
, One hundred and Twenty-first Ohio Infantry;
Capt.
M.
B.
Clason
, One hundred and Twenty-first Ohio Infantry; Capt. W
W.
Fellows
, One hundred and Twenty-fifth Illinois Infantry, acting brigade
inspector;
Capt.
Charles
H.
Chatfield
, Eighty-fifth Illinois Infantry;
Lieut
Patrick
, One hundred and Twenty-first Ohio Infantry, and
Captain
Bowersock
, One hundred and Thirteenth Ohio Infantry, whom I think it my duty to
mention in this report.
In the list of wounded are
Lieut. Col.
D.
B.
Warner
, One hundred and Thirteenth Ohio Infantry;
Capt.
Henry
O.
Mansfield
, Fifty-second Ohio Infantry;
Captain
Durant
, One hundred and Thirteenth Ohio Infantry;
Adjt.
C.
N.
Andrus
, Eiglty-fifth Illinois Volunteer Infantry;
Lieut.
Samuel
T.
Rogers
, Eighty-sixth Illinois Infantry;
Captain
Vanantwerp
, Eighty-sixth Illinois Infantry;
Captain
Howden
, Seventy-eighth Illinois Infantry;
Lieutenants
Lippincott
,
Bentley.
Baxter
,
Watson
, and
Dungan
, of the One hundred and Thirteenth Ohio Infantry; and
Lieutenants
Thomas
and
Lindsey
, of the Ninety.
eighth Ohio Infantry.
These gallant officers fell in leading their men to the enemy's works, some of them at the ditches.
On the morning of the
3d of July
the division moved in pursuit of the enemy, again in retreat.
Passing through Marietta and following the Twentieth Corps, went into bivouac at Nickajack Creek, in sight of the enemy's works at that place.
July
4
, opened with both batteries and pushed a heavy line of skirmishers across the creek and swamp.
In the afternoon Morgan's whole brigade was crossed and skirmished heavily with the enemy, and succeeded in
driving him into his main works.
This brigade bivouacked during the night close to the abatis of the enemy's works.
At daylight on the morning of the 5th
Major
Burnett
, of the Tenth Michigan Infantry, commanding the skirmish line,
reported through
General
Morgan
that the enemy had retreated, and the pursuit was resumed.
Passing through the enemy's works, the rear guard of the enemy was
pressed by the Thirty-fourth Illinois Regiment to within a few hundred yards
of his works on the Chattahoochee River.
Here his skirmishers made a determined stand, and the Fourteenth Michigan, the
One hundred and twentyfifth Illinois, and the Ninety-eighth Ohio Regiments were deployed, and after a severe skirmish drove the enemy from
his rifle-pits into his main works, from which, after occasional
skirmishing and considerable artillery fighting, he withdrew on the
9th of July
.
The enemy's works thus vacated were immediately occupied by a brigade and battery of my troops, until the
general crossing
of the river and advance upon Atlanta was resumed.
The short respite of a few days here given to the troops was well spent in a general burnishing up of guns and
accouterments,
and outfitting of the men with clothing.
On the morning of the 17th
Morgan
's and
Mitchell
's brigades and the batteries moved to the river at Pace's
Ferry at daylight.
After some delay on account of the pontoons not being laid, the command commenced to cross, and
Morgan
being in the advance found the enemy about one mile from the ferry, and after a sharp skirmish fight, in
which a part of
General
Johnson
's skirmishers took part, with his cavalry dismounted, drove them to and across Nancy's Creek.
The troops here bivouacked for the night.
On the morning of the 18th
Dilworth
's brigade joined the division, moving from its previous camp before daylight, and took the
advance of the column.
Little resistance was offered by the enemy to our advance during the day, and before night I was able to report
my troops
in camp on Peach Tree Creek, a short distance below Howell's Mill, picketing the bank from my front to its mouth.
On the
19th
, in compliance with verbal instructions from
Major-General
Thomas
, I ordered
Dilworth
to move his brigade to the mouth of Green Bone Creek in search of a
crossing said to exist there.
A point over which troops could be passed was found; it was also found strongly picketed by the enemy.
Dilworth
was ordered to drive these away, and to effect a lodgment of his troops on the opposite bank, if
possible.
This, after a severe skirmish, was accomplished in the afternoon.
The remainder of his brigade was ordered across, but had hardly formed on the opposite bank when a brigade of
the enemy sallied
out from their works to the support of their skirmishers, then driven back.
Dilworth
immediately pushed his lines forward in order to meet his foe on an advantageous ridge which lay in his
front.
The two forces here met in about equal numbers and at once brought on an engagement.
The fighting was very sharp on both sides, but soon resulted in a signal repulse of the enemy.
The loss was heavy on both sides, considering the numbers engaged and the short time the fight lasted.
This day's work was exceedingly creditable to both
Colonel
Dilworth
and command.
Mitchell
's brigade was ordered to the support of
Dilworth
.
It moved with great promptness, and succeeded in crossing in time to assist in the closing of this gallant
little fight and
repulse of the enemy.
Baird
's division crossed and took position on my left during the night.
Morgan
's brigade, with
Banning
's regiment, the One hundred and twenty-first Ohio, of
Mitchell
's brigade, and the batteries were held as reserved forces on the north bank of the creek.
Heavy details were required from these to picket the creek to its mouth, and some severe fighting was done at
different points,
when attempts were made by us to cross the stream.
On the
20th
I changed the position of my batteries.
Gardner
crossed the creek and was placed in the main line of
Dilworth
's works, and after a few rounds of excellent firing, drove the enemy from his rifle-pits in front.
The rest of my troops remained in nearly the same position, and skirmished sharply all day. On the morning of
the 12st it
was reported that the enemy had fallen back, and I ordered a reconnaissance to be made.
General
Baird
did the same in his front, but it was soon discovered that he had only withdrawn his picket-line closer
to his main works.
The enemy retreated during the night.
On the morning of the
22d
, keeping to the right of
Baird
's division, I moved my whole command to the west side of the Marietta road, and took position on the Turner's
Ferry road, connecting with
General
Baird
's right.
This position was a strong one, and, being for the time the extreme right of the whole army, I ordered it to be
well fortified.
My batteries bore upon the city from these works with great ease.
My command remained in this position without change until the 28th, when I received orders to make movement in
the direction of Turner's Ferry and East Point, and from thence toward
Howard
's right.
At this time my health, which had not been good for some days, required me to turn over the active and immediate
command of
the troops to
General
Morgan
.
The movement was promptly commenced by
General
Morgan
, but, before being completed, the enemy attacked
General
Howard
's command on the right in heavy force, and, in compliance with instructions from
Major-General
Sherman
, I sent a staff officer to order
Morgan
to
Howard
's support.
Morgan
, who, when the messenger reached him, was several miles off, turned his column at once in the direction
of the fighting.
Every effort was made by
General
Morgan
to reach the position, but he was unable to do so until the enemy had been repulsed.
The troops went into bivouac long after night, much fatigued from the long march and excessive heat.
On the
29th
the division took position on the right of the Army of
the Tennessee, and intrenched itself, where it remained with little change until the 4th, when, in
accordance with orders, it moved across Utoy Creek and took
position on the right and rear of
Baird
's division.
This was accomplished after some heavy skirmishing, in which the enemy's artillery took part.
On the
5th
the division took ground to the right and front, the left brigade connecting with
Baird
's right flank, where it remained much exposed to the enemy's shell until the 7th, when, in compliance
with instructions, it moved forward; wheeling on the left, formed a new line close to the enemy's works.
In the execution of this movement there was some fighting, and a number of prisoners were taken.
On the
8th
four regiments from the First and Second Brigades were sent to the right of
the Twenty-third Corps, which was making some demonstrations against
the enemy, and acted as a reserve to that command during the day; at night
they returned to camp.
On the morning of the
20th
, in compliance with instructions from corps headquarters, I ordered
General
Morgan
to make, with his own and
Dilworth
's brigades, a reconnaissance in the direction of Red
Oak, and, if possible, to reach the railroad at that point.
Two brigades of
Baird
's division and one from
Carlin
's reported to me on the Campbellton road, to be used, if
necessary, in support of this movement.
General
Morgan
pushed the reconnaissance with vigor, and reached the railroad, as desired.
After destroying a small portion of the track, and reporting to me his success, I ordered the troops to return
to their respective
camps.
During the 21st and and 22d the location of the troops remained without change.
On the
22d
I turned over the command of the division to
Brigadier-General
Morgan
, and, in compliance with Special Orders, No. 241, War
Department, dated
August
9, 1864
, assumed command of the Fourteenth Army Corps, relieving
Brig. Gen.
R.
W.
Johnson
.
This ends my connection with the division as its immediate commander, but before closing this report, and taking
leave of
the troops, with whom I have so long been associated amid the scenes of active operations unparalleled in the
history of war,
I feel it my duty, as it is my greatest pleasure, to record a few words expressive of my high appreciation of
the zeal, endurance,
and courage exhibited by them throughout this long and bloody campaign ��� a campaign which required the highest
skill in
commanders to meet the varying exigencies and demanded from the ranks sacrifices which none but the soldiers of
a brave and
intelligent people struggling for the preservation of their Government could make.
The lists of casualties will show how nobly the troops met the stern demands of the battle-field; but the
patriotic zeal and
devotion displayed by them in meeting the no less stern requirements of the bivouac, the march, and the trenches
their immediate
commanders and companions in arms can only know and record.
These will long be remembered by all, and a grateful country will appreciate and reward such heroism and
devotion in her cause.
Among those officers whose rank and position brought them more immediately under my observation during the
campaign, of whom
I desire to make special mention, are
Brig. Gen.
James
D.
Morgan
, commanding First Brigade, and next to me in rank in the division.
To him I am under many obligations for his active and efficient cooperation at all times and under all
circumstances.
He has, in my judgment, earned promotion, and I earnestly recommend him to the consideration of the Government
for it.
Col.
John
G.
Mitchell
, commanding the Second Brigade of the division, has been recommended
by me for promotion to the rank of brigadier-general in special recommendation for
faithful services as brigade commander and distinguished conduct throughout the campaign.
Col.
C.
J.
Dilworth
, of the Eighty-sixth Illinois Regiment, has commanded the Third Brigade since the assault on the enemy's works on the
27th of June
; his efficiency as a commander and personal gallantry on that as well as other and more recent occasions
has made it my duty
to recommend him for promotion.
The following regimental commanders are recommended for the appointment of brevet brigadier-generals for their
abilities as commanders and distinguished conduct
throughout the campaign:
Col.
H.
B.
Banning
, One hundred
and twenty-first Ohio Regiment, and
Col.
William
B.
Anderson
, Sixtieth Illinois Regiment.
There are a number of other regimental commanders, whose rank is less than that of colonel, who have richly
earned another
grade.
I hope their regiments will soon be filled by the necessary recruits, and thoy commissioned accordingly by the
Governors of their respective States.
Where so many subordinate officers have distinguished themselves it is impossible to discriminate.
The artillery attached to this division consisted of Battery I, Second Illinois Artillery, and the Fifth Wisconsin
Battery.
The efficiency, discipline, and good conduct on the march and in battle of both officers and men was in the
highest degree
commendable.
Capt.
Charles
M.
Barnett
, chief of artillery, proved himself a skillful and energetic officer by his excellent management of his
batteries throughout the campaign.
Captain
Gardner
and
Lieutenant
Coe
, battery commanders, performed their duties ably and efficiently.
Their batteries are among the best in the service.
To my staff-consisting of
Capt.
T.
W.
Morrison
, assistant adjutant-general;
Maj.
John
H.
Phillips
, medical director;
Thomas
H.
Daily
, captain and aide-de-camp;
Lieut.
Thomas
J.
Carney
, aidede-camp;
Capt.
James
L.
Orr
, commissary of subsistence;
Capt.
J.
E.
Remington
, assistant quartermaster;
Capt.
Leonidas
A.
Cole
, commissary of musters;
Capt.
Charles
M.
Barnett
, chief of artillery;
Capt.
Hamilton
W.
Hall
, inspector;
Capt.
John
F.
Squier
, provostmarshal;
Lieut.
John
Paul
Kuntze
, topographical engineer;
Lieut.
George
Scroggs
, ordnance officer ��� I am again under obligations for their zealous assistance throughout the campaign.
Their duties were often exceedingly arduous, and were always performed by them with skill and alacrity, whether
on the field
of battle or elsewhere.
No list of casualties accompanies this report.
This will be found in
General
Morgan
's report, which closes with the termination of the campaign.
Capt.
A.
C.
McCLURG
,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Fourteenth Army Corps.
Hdqrs. Second Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, In the Field,
June
28, 1864
.
Captain: The following is a corrected report of the casualties in this division as given by the brigade
commanders in yesterday's
operations:
Zzz
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Capt. A. C. McCLURG , Assistant Adjutant-General, Fourteenth Army Corps.