General: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Fourteenth Army Corps from the 22d of August , on which day I assumed command of it, to the 8th of September , when it went into camp at this place:

At the time of assuming command the position of the corps was located on Utoy Creek, and west of Atlanta, and nearly opposite East Point. It was and had been for some days detached from the Army of the Cumberland and was acting under the immediate direction of Major-General Schofield , commanding the Army of the Ohio, in our movements against the enemy's position at East Point. After the receipt of Special Field Orders, No. 57, headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, directing the movements of the army against the Macon railroad, the corps was held in readiness until the 26th when, as a preliminary movement, it withdrew from the fieldworks and went into bivouac on the south side of Utoy Creek. This movement was of necessity made during the night, and owing to the excessive rain, bad roads, and darkness of the night, was not accomplished until after daylight the next morning. On the 27th the corps remained in camp, awaiting the movements of other commands, cutting roads, &c., preparatory to marching the next morning. At 4 a. m. the 28th the corps moved to Mount Gilead Church, where it passed the Fourth Corps, and taking the advance reached its designated camp near Rough and Ready late in the afternoon. During the day's march Morgan 's division had the advance, and skirmished quite lively with the enemy's cavalry at and south of Camp Creek. On the 29th the location of my camp remained unchanged; a part of the troops were kept vigorously at work during the day, destroying the railroad track, making reconnaissances, and cutting roads to facilitate our advance the next morning. On the morning of the 30th , in compliance with instructions from Major-General Thomas , the corps moved at an early hour to Shoal Creek Church, on the neighborhood road, where it bivouacked for a few hours, the troops getting their dinners during the halt. From this position it marched to Couch's house, on the Rough and Ready and Jonesborough road , in the following order: Baird 's division, on the left, in co-operating distance with the Fourth Corps; Morgan 's division, followed by Carlin 's, and the train moved on a more direct road to the right, in supporting distance of Baird . The enemy offered little resistance and the whole command went into camp before night. My left connected with the Fourth Corps, my right one mile from Renfroe's Cross-Roads , at which point the Army of the Tennessee was operating. On the morning of the 31st General Baird . with his own and one brigade of General Morgan 's division, was ordered to make a reconnaissance in the direction of the Macon railroad. The road was reached and a party kept at work destroying the track until the following day. Baird intrenched his command on the Rough and Ready road, near Smith's house, where it remained until joined by the corps the next day. Carlin 's division moved in the morning to Renfroe's Cross-Roads, for the purpose of guarding the different trains collecting at that place. Late in the evening this division was hurriedly ordered to the support of the Army of the Tennessee, then reported to be engaged with the enemy, and Morgan 's division was ordered to take its place at Renfroe's and to picket well to the front on the Fayetteville road; this he did. The emergency for which Carlin 's division had been called to the support of General Howard 's troops ceased to exist, the enemy having been repulsed, and the fact being reported to me, I ordered Carlin to return to his camp of the previous night. On the morning of the 1st of September I received orders from department headquarters to move with Morgan 's division and two brigades of Carlin 's and join with Baird 's, and then to move in support of General Howard 's left. Leaving one brigade at Renfroe's to guard the trains, as directed, Carlin marched promptly to the Rough and Ready road and halted his command a short distance in advance of Baird's field-works on the right. Morgan , with two brigades, marched promptly from Renfroe's, and, following Carlin , reported to me at General Baird 's headquarters, where, in compliance with orders, Mitchell 's brigade rejoined its division. Here I was informed by the department commander of the movement of Major-General Stanley 's corps (Fourth) down the railroad, and of his desire that the two corps should move in co-operating distance toward Jonesborough. I immediately put the column in motion in the following order: Carlin in advance, followed by Morgan ; Baird in reserve. In this order the whole corps moved rapidly until the head of the column reached Smith's house, near Mokers Creek, where it found the pickets of the Army of the Tennessee. As the next movement of my troops would evidently be made over the ground lying between the left of the position of the Army of the Tennessee and the railroad, along which Stanley was moving, I directed Carlin to send a brigade to make a reconnaissance of the ground in that direction. While this was being executed I conferred with Major-General Howard and received from him the position of his own troops and such information concerning the enemy's as he was able to give. An inspection of the ground between the head of the column and that part of the enemy's works which could be seen, and which was supposed to be his extreme right, showed a commanding ridge, immediately beyond the creek, from which an attack could be made with advantage. The enemy occupied this ridge in some force, both of infantry and artillery, but how strong could not be determined until Edie 's brigade, in executing its reconnaissance, solved the question by gallantly advancing, and after a sharp skirmish took possession of the hill, pressing the enemy's artillery very close.

The department commander arriving at the head of my column at this time, I reported to him, and he ordered me to move forward in the direction of Jonesborough, expressing at the time some apprehensions that General Stanley 's column might be in advance of mine. To advance beyond the ridge now held by Edie 's brigade involved a general engagement, or a retreat of the enemy, and I determined, therefore, to push forward my troops to that point in column, aad deploy for action. Resuming the advance, Carlin was ordered to rove forward with the remainder of his division, and to form on the left of his Second Brigade, already in position. Morgan was ordered to move rapidly by the main road, and, after crossing the creek at Chambers' Mill, to move to the left and take position on Carlin 's right on the ridge ��� in taking position, to be guarded by the natural advantages of the ground. Baird moving forward, closed upon Carlin 's left in reserve. These movements were promptly executed, notwithstanding the rough nature of the ground and the fire of artillery from the enemy's works, to which Morgan 's division was frequently subjected. By this time Prescott 's battery had taken a good position on the ridge, and opened an exceedingly well-directed fire upon the enemy's works. In this he was soon followed by Gardner , and a general artillery fight ensued, which, as results showed afterward, was exceedingly complimentary to our artillerists. General Stanley 's corps was reported as having arrived, and was taking position on my left, his right resting on the railroad. The ridge upon which my troops was now concentrated was, in its main direction, nearly east and west, and faced nearly parallel with that part of the enemy's line of works, which was refused and formed his right, his main works running in general direction north, east, and southwest, as shown by the accompanying map. Not found. From information believed to be reliable, I was satisfied the enemy's works had not been extended to the railroad at a late hour in the forenoon, and that a well-directed attack would rout this part of his lines and turn his position completely. Morgan 's division, and the two brigades of Carlin 's, were to form the attacking forces, and were deployed in two lines as near continuous to each other as the rough and difficult ground over which the advance had to be made would permit. One brigade, of Baird 's division, was deployed in rear of Carlin 's left, in close support. The distance to be passed in front of Morgan 's, where the enemy's works could be seen, was about 1,000 yards. Where the enemy might be found in Carlin 's front, owing to the dense thicket before him, could not be determined without an advance, which I ordered about 4 p. m. The troops moved promptly, but owing to the thick undergrowth of brush in Carlin 's front, swampy ground and ditches in Morgan 's, the troops necessarily moved slow, and with great difficulty observed alignments and direction. These obstacles were as speedily overcome as could be expected, and the whole line advanced to the slope of the hill, in the open field, within from 300 to 400 yards of the enemy's position. Here the ground offered some protection to the troops, and a momentary halt was made, and the lines rectified. Up to this point the effect of the enemy's fire had been but lightly felt, generally along the line, except by Edie 's brigade, which was some distance in advance of the general line, and had struck a projecting flank of the enemy's works, charged, and carried it, with considerable loss. The position thus gallantly gained was only partially held, owing to the impossibility of supports getting up in time. Este 's brigade, of Baird 's division, was ordered to report to General Carlin as a support to this part of the line, and was promptly placed in position so as to relieve this brigade in the following attack. The other two brigades of Baird 's division were held close in reserve in rear of the left of the corps, with a view to pushing our success on this flank after the position had been carried. At a quarter to 5 o'clock I ordered the lines, as now formed and represented by the accompanying map, Not found. to advance and attack. The desultory firing which had been kept up by the enemy during the temporary pause in the advance, did but little damage, but served to locate the enemy's lines more definitely, which, owing to the dense thicket intervening, could not be well defined. The attack was promptly and vigorously made along the whole line. The enemy, self-confident and exultant at our audacity in attacking lines thus defended, made a most determined resistance. The fight was short and bloody. The entire line of works was carried, except the extreme left, formed of Moore 's brigade. Here from natural obstructions, heavy timber, and underbrush, as well as a severe fire from his left, coming from the opposite side of the railroad, this brigade operated under great disadvantage, and was for awhile held in check, notwithstanding the troops fought with great gallantry and were well handled. Elsewhere, at all points, the assault was decisive and complete along the entire line. Eight hundred and sixty-five officers and men surrendered themselves in the works. About 1,000 more were captured, or surrendered themselves to different commands during the night and the following day, which should be credited to the assault, as a result of it. Two field batteries, consisting of four guns each, were captured complete. The troops charged these batteries, under a murderous fire of canister, and took them in the works. Seven battle-flags and 14 officer's swords were captured, and have been forwarded, as required by existing orders, to department headquarters. These trophies were won behind the breast-works of the enemy at the point of the sword and the bayonet. They will ever be preserved and cherished as evidences of the discipline and valor signalizing the conduct of the troops in this bloody conflict.

A want of knowledge of the ground over which the several commanders were required to maneuver their troops, and its exceedingly rough surface, rendered their duties sometimes exceedingly difficult, and I deem it both a duty and pleasure to report the energy and skill displayed in the execution of them. To the division commanders, Brigadier-Generals Baird , Morgan , and Carlin , and their staffs, my thanks are due for their active assistance and co-operation during the engagement. The immediate presence of these old and well-known commanders among the troops during the movements of heaviest battle did much toward inspiring that coolness and determination so strikingly exhibited on this occasion. As so often occurs, night came with our victory and prevented us from reaping the full fruits of it. An entire corps of the enemy was completely routed, and could beyond all doubt have been captured had pursuit been possible.

The corps bivouacked on the field during the night, and the following morning formed and took position in the column of pursuit, but was immediately afterward ordered by the major-general commanding the department to form the rear guard of the army in its movements farther south. Colonel Taylor 's brigade, of Carlin 's division, here joined its division. Going into camp at Jonesborough awaiting orders, it remained in reserve during the intervening days of active operations of the troops near Lovejoy's Station until the morning of the 7th , when, in compliance with orders announcing the evacuation of Atlanta, and directing the movements of the troops in the return to that place, it withdrew from Jonesborough and marched to Rough and Ready and went into camp. On the morning of the 8th marched and went into permanent camp at this place, thus ending the long and eventful campaign.

A list of casualties See statements with reports of subordinate commanders. showing the loss in the corps from the beginning of the campaign is transmitted; also the reports of the several division, brigade, and regimental commanders are transmitted, and attention called to them as valuable records of the operations of their respective commands.--They will aid the commanding general in reviewing that part of the operations of the corps from the commencement of the campaign to the date of my assuming command, (luring which time the corps was commanded by Major-General Palmer , now absent, but who will no doubt in time furnish this part of the corps record. The efficiency and morale of the corps is excellent. A return of absentees and a few recruits to fill the vacancies in the ranks is all that is required to make it as efficient as at the commencement of the campaign.

The organization of the staff has undergone a number of changes since the commencement of the campaign, but consisted during the time above described of Capt. A. C. McClurg , assistant adjutantgeneral and chief of staff; Capt. T. W. Morrison , assistant adjutantgeneral; Capt. John F. Squier , Seventy-fourth Illinois Infantry, aide-de-camp; Lieut. T. J. Carney , Thirty-fourth Illinois Infantry, aide-de-camp; Lieut. Col. A. von Schrader , U. S. Volunteers, assistant inspector-general; Lieut. Col. J. R. Paul , U. S. Volunteers, chief commissary of subsistence; Capt. J. E. Remington , U. S. Volunteers, chief quartermaster; Maj. Charles Houghtaling , First Illinois Artillery, chief of artillery; Surg. F. Salter , U. S. Volunteers, medical director; Maj. John B. Lee , One hundred and twentyfifth Illinois Infantry, provost-marshal; Capt. Jesse Fulmer , Fifteenth U. S. Infantry, commissary of musters; Capt. L. H. Drury , Third Wisconsin Battery, assistant chief of artillery; Capt. J. C. Martin , Twenty-first Ohio Infantry, staff quartermaster; Capt. A. L. Messmore , One hundred and thirteenth Ohio Infantry, staff commissary of subsistence; Capt. A. S. Cole , chief signal officer; Capt. William H. Collins , One hundred and fourth Illinois Infantry, chief of ambulances, and Capt. George Estep , artillery ordnance officer. The efficiency of these officers in their, respective duties has been highly satisfactory, and it affords me pleasure to recommend them to the consideration of the general commanding, and also to acknowledge my indebtedness to them for their valuable assistance.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

General: I have the honor to report that at an early hour yes, terday morning, in obedience to the orders of the army commander, two brigades of General Carlin 's division and General Morgan 's entire division moved from their respective positions near Couch 's and Renfroe's to the support of General Baird , whose division lay in a northeasterly direction upon the Rough and Ready and Jonesborough road and upon the railroad. Forming a junction at this point, the corps moved south upon the Jonesborough road, General Carlin in advance, followed by General Morgan and General Baird .

Marching two or two and a half miles south upon this road the pickets of the Seventeenth Corps were found. One brigade of General Carlin 's division was immediately pushed eastward on a reconnaissance. They advanced a mile, driving in the enemy's skirmishers and gaining possession of a ridge in their front with but small loss. The other brigade of this division was pushed forward and formed upon their right. General Morgan 's division moved south upon the Jonesborough road, formed his lines to the east of the road and to the east of Flint River (which General Carlin had also crossed), and advancing began to feel for General Carlin 's right. Meanwhile Captain Prescott 's battery gained a commanding position, enfilading the enemy's lines and silencing a battery upon General Morgan 's front. Connection was formed between General Morgan and General Carlin , and the lines of battle were formed. The lines of attack consisted of Carlin 's two brigades and Morgan 's entire division. The enemy was vigorously attacked and driven back several hundred yards to their main works. By this time the regular brigade of Carlin 's division had suffered so heavily that I directed it to be relieved by one of General Baird 's brigades, and a general assault of the enemy's position was ordered. The works were carried along the entire line after very heavy fighting and a loss in killed, wounded, and missing of about 1,000 men. This is only an estimate, as it is impossible to get accurate returns at this time.

Two field batteries (consisting of 10 guns) were captured in the enemy's works. Probably about 1,000 prisoners were captured, with Brigadier-General Govan and a number of officers. Several (10 reported) battle-flags were taken.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Report of casualties of the Fourteenth Army Corps for September 1, 1864 .

Report of casualties of the Fourteenth Army Corps, &c.-continued.